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ABSTRACT 
This project examined the potential impact of process savings achieved through 
strategically sourced contracts on the Air Force Installation Contracting Agency’s (AFICA) 
manpower. The project leveraged AFICA’s contract man-hour data to make logical 
inferences concerning the transaction costs of various strategically sourced contracts. The 
information derived from the transaction cost analysis was used to construct a theoretical 
linear program (LP) to optimize manpower with respect to man-hour savings achieved 
through strategically sourced contracts. The optimized manpower solution provides a 
theoretical framework to identify manpower savings that may be used to address AFICA 
mission objectives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this project is to develop a theoretical framework to explore how process 
savings generated by strategically sourced contracts may be leveraged by AFICA to optimize 
manpower at the operational contracting squadron (CONS) level. In the following 
paragraphs, the project objective is defined, a brief background of process savings in Air 
Force Installation Contracting Agency (AFICA) is provided, the scope of the research is 
defined, and the research question is posed. 
A. PROJECT OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this project is to develop a theoretical model to optimize manpower 
in order to process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. Specifically, this 
project leveraged AFICA’s contract man-hour data to make logical inferences concerning the 
transaction costs of various strategically sourced contracts. The information derived from the 
transaction cost analysis was used to construct a linear program (LP) to optimize manpower 
with respect to process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. The 
optimized manpower solution derived from the LP provides a theoretical framework for 
AFICA to identify manpower savings that may be used to address other mission objectives.  
Although the manpower outputs of the model suggest that AFICA may be able to 
leverage process savings by reducing manpower, the goal of this project is to provide a 
theoretical basis for identifying manpower savings that may be used to address other mission 
objectives. By leveraging manpower savings, this project argues that AFICA may be able to 
meet more mission needs without adversely affecting the mission of operational CONSs.  
B. BACKGROUND 
AFICA is responsible for improving operational contracting efficiency by capitalizing 
on strategic sourcing opportunities “while reducing the resources required for support and 
execution” (Muir, Keller, & Knight, 2014, p. 15). Strategically sourced contracts help 
achieve procurement efficiencies by reducing manpower inputs (Anderson & Woolley, 2002 
p. 66), streamlining procurement processes, and rationalizing the government’s supply base 
(Lieberman, Collins, Issa, & Cummings, 2012, p. 5). Although the concept of improving 
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efficiency is central to AFICA’s core function, there is little guidance concerning actionable 
steps for managing manpower savings achieved through procurement efficiencies. For 
example, AFICA (2017) established a means for quantifying process savings; however, it 
does not appear that AFICA has an established policy for leveraging manpower savings 
beyond the operational CONS level. AFICA may benefit from internal manpower 
optimizations that provide a top-down perspective on which units may have excess 
contracting capacity to accomplish more work.  
This project aims to bridge the gap between federal directives to achieve procurement 
efficiencies and agency-wide efforts to leverage procurement efficiencies to optimize the 
contracting workforce. The ongoing effort to quantify and leverage procurement efficiencies 
is a priority for AFICA. This project is a collaborative effort with AFICA to research 
frameworks to quantify and leverage procurement efficiencies achieved through AFICA’s 
strategically sourced contracts.  
C. SCOPE 
The findings and the theoretical manpower model proposed by this project are 
applicable to all AFICA operational CONSs at or below the wing. The findings and the 
model proposed by this project are not applicable to enterprise sourcing squadrons (ESSs) or 
specialized contracting squadrons (SCONSs). Although ESSs and SCONSs are manpower-
driven organizations, manpower for ESSs and SCONSs is typically dictated by factors such 
as policy development and enterprise-wide market intelligence. The theoretical manpower 
model proposed by this project optimizes manpower in respect to contracting production. 
Consequently, the model cannot assess the manpower needs of an ESS or a SCONS. 
Although the results of the model are based on AFICA-specific data, the general 
optimization framework is externally valid to any federal agency with contracting units using 
strategically sourced contracts. This project is an extension of the 2014 Operational 
Contracting (OC) 12A000 Air Force Manpower Standard (AFMS) study (Carter, 2014). The 
scope of this project conforms to the 2014 OC AFMS study conducted by the Fifth 
Manpower Readiness Squadron (5MRS; Carter, 2014). 
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The manpower optimization model proposed by this project is theoretical in nature 
and is not designed to aid leadership in making strategic manpower decisions. Rather, the 
model provides a theoretical framework to analyze the potential benefits of process savings 
on AFICA’s manpower.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project is designed to explore one central question: how can AFICA leverage 
process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts to identify manpower 
savings that may be used to address other mission objectives? The objective of the proposed 
manpower optimization model is to provide a theoretical framework for AFICA to identify 
manpower savings that may be used to accomplish other mission objectives. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to develop a theoretical manpower optimization model that leverages process 
savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts, this project reviewed scholarly 
research pertaining to (1) AFICA’s definition of procurement efficiency, (2) the implications 
of category management and strategic sourcing to process savings, (3) how industry 
leverages process savings, (4) how federal contracting leverages process savings, (5) the 
implications of learning curve theory to AFICA process savings, (6) the implications of best-
in-class acquisition practices to AFICA process savings, (7) the implications of transaction 
cost theory to process savings, (8) the Air Force’s Personnel Center’s (AFPC’s) policy for 
manpower determinations, (9) the 2014 OC AFMS, (10) AFICA’s preliminary Transaction 
Cost Schedule, (11) AFICA’s preliminary Transaction Cost Comparison Table, and (12) 
optimizing manpower using a LP. The manpower optimization model coalesces the major 
concepts in the literature review to develop a theoretical framework for converting process 
savings into manpower savings. 
A. AFICA’S DEFINITION OF CONTRACTING EFFICIENCY 
For the purposes of this project, procurement efficiencies refer to any process or 
demand savings which directly or indirectly reduce the man-hour burden for operational 
CONSs. Below is a brief explanation of how AFICA analyzes procurement efficiencies, and 
how these efficiencies are directly or indirectly related to man-hour demand at the 
operational CONS level. 
AFICA measures procurement efficiency through process, demand, and rate savings 
(Q. M. Hearns, personal communication, August 31, 2017). Process savings “reduce 
operational redundancy” (Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center [AFIMSC], 
2017, p. 8) by improving ordering efficiencies, standardizing requirements, and reducing the 
number of transactions. Demand savings “maximize the mission return of each AF dollar 
invested” (AFIMSC, 2017, p. 8) by controlling requirement demand, reducing consumption, 
and changing the product mix. Rate savings optimize program costs through price reductions, 
discounts, and rebates (AFIMSC, 2017). 
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Although AFICA measures procurement efficiencies through process, demand, and 
rate savings, only process and demand savings provide a clear connection to man-hour 
savings. For example, streamlined procurement processes should theoretically reduce the 
contracting man-hours necessary to execute an award. Additionally, the elimination of 
redundant contracts should also reduce the associated man-hour demand. Lastly, controlling 
consumption through demand management may result in fewer contract actions and the 
associated man-hour requirements. Although rate savings may result in lower program costs, 
reduced prices may not translate to a lower man-hour demand at the operational CONS level. 
While many procurement efficiencies are achieved by contracting functions (e.g., 
streamlined ordering processes for strategically sourced contracts), other procurement 
efficiencies, such as demand savings, are primarily attributable to consumption modifications 
made by requirement owners. 
Many corporations and federal agencies do not categorize procurement efficiencies 
within the context of process, demand, and rate savings. However, corporations and federal 
agencies generally ascribe to AFICA’s definition of process and demand savings. For 
example, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB; 2015) describes process savings in 
terms of acquisition process improvements achieved through best-in-class acquisition 
practices. Additionally, the OMB (2015) describes contracting efficiency in terms of total 
contract reductions (demand savings). The Unilever Corporation described procurement 
efficiency in terms of cost savings achieved by streamlining purchasing functions (process 
savings), controlling consumption (demand savings), and workforce reductions (Anderson & 
Woolley, 2002). Regardless of the terminology, all procurement efficiencies described in this 
project imply a direct or indirect reduction in operational contracting man-hour demand. 
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CATEGORY MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC 
SOURCING TO PROCESS SAVINGS 
Category management and strategic sourcing are the primary business approaches 
that AFICA uses to promote process savings at the enterprise and operational CONS level. 
The following paragraphs contain a discussion on (1) the evolution and definition of category 
management and strategic sourcing and (2) how each approach is used to promote process 
savings in AFICA. 
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The OMB (2015) defines strategic sourcing as “the establishment or modification of 
acquisition vehicles to better address Federal Government procurement needs and/or more 
effectively leverage spend, market position, market knowledge (e.g., price benchmarks), and 
capabilities (e.g., IT integration) in contract terms and conditions” (p. 30). In short, strategic 
sourcing aims to achieve lower total cost of ownership (TCO) by identifying common 
sources of spend across the enterprise and capturing economies of scale and process savings 
by establishing contracts with vendors. Although strategic sourcing provides a viable way to 
reduce TCO, strategic sourcing cannot adequately address non-contractual savings, such as 
enterprise-wide consumption control and requirement standardization.  
To address these deficiencies, federal and agency-level category management teams 
were developed to maximize TCO savings. The OMB (2015) defines category management 
as a structured approach aimed at defining common, enterprise-wide products and services in 
order “to buy smarter and more like a single enterprise” (p. 9). Unlike strategic sourcing, 
category management also considers “a broader set of strategies to drive performance, like 
developing common standards in practices and contracts, driving greater transparency in 
acquisition performance, improving data analysis, and more frequently using private sector 
(as well as government) best practices” (Rung, 2014, p. 2). In order to holistically address 
TCO savings, each category is led by an experienced subject matter expert capable of 
developing enterprise-wide strategies to drive performance and TCO savings (Rung, 2014). 
Strategic sourcing is one of many tools a category manager may use to achieve TCO savings. 
Although category management effectively addresses enterprise-wide process 
savings, these process savings may be difficult to quantify at the operational CONS level 
because the process savings are not clearly traceable to a contract action. For example, to 
augment the market intelligence of category teams, the Government Services Administration 
(GSA) launched the web-based Acquisition Gateway (OMB, 2015). Although the 
Acquisition Gateway may be having significant impacts on improving process savings (e.g., 
expediting market research), these savings are generally not discernable at the operational 
CONS level.  
Conversely, strategically sourced contracts provide a more tangible basis for 
analyzing process savings because strategically sourced contracts can be compared to the 
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process cost of a comparable open-market contract (i.e., man-hour cost of an open-market 
contract versus a strategically sourced contract). Additionally, process savings achieved 
through category management are often manifested in strategically sourced contracts. For 
example, a category manager’s decision to standardize a requirement may be manifested in 
the performance work statement (PWS) of the strategically sourced contract. For the 
purposes of the project, only process savings attributable to strategically sourced contracts 
were analyzed. 
C. HOW INDUSTRY LEVERAGES PROCESS SAVINGS 
In the procurement and supply management fields, strategic sourcing is one of the 
most prominent methods used by organizations to achieve process savings (Yagoob & Zuo, 
2015). Anderson and Katz (1998) defined strategic sourcing as a systematic framework “to 
leverage the corporate buy, … minimize linked costs in the supply chain, and maximize the 
value of goods and services” (p. 1). To achieve these ends, strategic sourcing involves 
“managing the supply base in an effective manner by identifying and selecting suppliers for 
strategic long-term partnerships” (Talluri & Narasimhan, 2004, p. 236) that are aligned with 
a corporation’s competitive strategy. In order to execute strategic sourcing, both private and 
public organizations establish framework agreements with strategic partners and suppliers 
(Karjalainen, Kemppainen, & van Raaij, 2009). Typically, strategic sourcing is characterized 
by centralized purchasing and the systematic migration “from numerous individual 
procurements” to collaborative agreements with strategic suppliers (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2011, p. 215). As the commercial marketplace continues to 
become more competitive and dynamic, business leaders are increasingly turning to strategic 
sourcing to improve efficiencies and reduce costs (Kraljic, 1983). 
Business leaders that have led successful strategic sourcing efforts report billions in 
savings and substantial quality and service improvements (GAO, 2011). Lieberman et al. 
(2012) reported that companies that used strategic sourcing experienced a 10–20% reduction 
in total procurement costs and “a more efficient and effective enterprisewide process” (p. 5). 
Organizations such as the Unilever Corporation leveraged procurement efficiencies achieved 
through strategic sourcing to save billions of dollars and reduce manpower by approximately 
25,000 employees over a five-year period (Anderson & Woolley, 2002, p. 66). The federal 
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government has begun incorporating strategic sourcing principles in hopes of replicating 
commercial successes (Lieberman et al., 2012). 
D. HOW FEDERAL CONTRACTING LEVERAGES PROCESS SAVINGS 
Unlike industry, public contracting generally does not leverage process savings to 
optimize manpower. Although the objective of this project is not to cut contracting 
manpower (e.g., the Unilever Corporation; Anderson & Woolley, 2002, p. 66), AFICA may 
be able to leverage process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts to 
identify excess manpower that may be used to address other mission objectives. The 
following paragraphs contain a discussion of federal and AFICA policies pertaining to the 
importance of achieving procurement efficiencies and the prescribed methods for quantifying 
and leveraging process savings. 
Federal acquisition officials generally agree that achieving procurement efficiencies 
is important for improving value and reducing costs. The OMB challenged agencies to “make 
business decisions about acquiring commodities more effectively and efficiently” (Johnson, 
2005, p. 1) as part of a commitment to increase value and reduce acquisition costs. Rung 
(2014) continued the mantra of improving federal procurement efficiency by implementing 
concepts such as category management to create “a more innovative, efficient, and effective 
acquisition system” (p. 1). These OMB directives to improve procurement efficiencies 
resulted in the establishment of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI) in 2005 and 
the Category Management Leadership Council (CMLC) and Government-Wide Category 
Management Guidance Document in 2015 (OMB, 2015). These organizations confront the 
challenge of improving procurement efficiencies by incorporating practices such as planned 
demand reduction, strategic sourcing, and best-in-class acquisition practices (OMB, 2015). 
Additionally, agency-level organizations, such as AFICA, continuously improve efficiencies 
by capitalizing “on strategic sourcing opportunities at the enterprise and major command 
levels while reducing the resources required for support and execution” (Muir et al., 2014, p. 
15). 
Although federal and agency-level policies corroborate the importance of improving 
procurement efficiencies, there is little guidance for quantifying and leveraging procurement 
efficiencies to optimize manpower. Federal acquisition officials generally agree that 
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quantifying and leveraging procurement efficiencies is difficult and subjective. Despite 
appreciable efficiency improvements, the GAO found that agency officials were hesitant to 
quantify efficiencies achieved through strategic sourcing, such as contract consolidation, 
administrative savings, and streamlined procurement processes, because the efficiencies were 
difficult to quantify (Lieberman et al., 2012). The OMB (2015) corroborated the GAO’s 
findings: “While savings is a desired outcome of category management, it is often difficult to 
quantify. As such, savings data should be focused on areas where specific data is readily 
available” (p. 33). Due to the difficulties associated with quantifying procurement 
efficiencies, the OMB (2015) does not appraise contracting efficiencies or administrative 
savings. The OMB (2015) recognized the shortcomings of the prescribed metrics for 
contracting efficiency and promised improved reporting and analysis over time.  
In addition to the difficulty of quantifying procurement efficiencies, realized 
procurement efficiencies may have an adverse effect on an organization’s budget and 
manpower. For example, the AFPC may suggest that since AFICA is so efficient, it should 
require less manpower. However, AFICA may have plans to gainfully employ its excess 
manpower to meet other mission objectives. 
As previously mentioned, AFICA lacks a definitive process for quantifying and 
leveraging procurement efficiencies to optimize manpower. AFICA (2017) quantifies process 
savings in terms of (1) man-hour savings achieved by consolidating contracts and (2) man-
hour savings achieved through ad-hoc process improvements. AFICA (2017) used the 2014 
OC AFMS contract man-hour data as the basis for establishing process savings for 
consolidating contracts. Although AFICA uniformly quantifies process savings in terms of 
man-hours, the relative value of a man-hour is unknown. For example, man-hour savings 
attributable to contract consolidation may be worth more than man-hour savings attributable 
to process improvements because higher skill-level (and more expensive) labor was 
previously involved in awarding multiple contracts. Additionally, man-hour savings should 
be leveraged in some way (e.g., using the excess capacity to address operational CONS or 
AFICA taskers, training requirements, additional duties, readiness needs, and so forth). A 
highly efficient CONS may simply have less work to do if wing and readiness requirements 
are relatively fixed. If AFICA optimized manpower in accordance with achieved process 
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savings, AFICA may be able to use the manpower savings to address other mission 
objectives. 
It is important to note that this project does not presuppose that all operational 
CONSs are adequately staffed to meet their mission objectives. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that some operational CONSs are currently challenged to satisfy wing and readiness 
requirements given current resourcing. Regardless of the current manning level, internal 
manpower optimizations that account for potential process savings achieved through 
strategically sourced contracts provide AFICA with a better assessment of the contracting 
capacity available at any given operational CONS. 
E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LEARNING CURVE THEORY TO FEDERAL 
CONTRACTING 
Learning curve theory provides a conceptual framework to describe organizational 
learning within the context of process efficiency. According to Mislick and Nussbaum 
(2015), empirical research suggests that performance improves with learning achieved 
through consistent repetition. Quantitatively, learning is expressed by the following 
relationship: as productivity doubles, the cost of producing a single unit decreases by a 
constant percentage (Mislick & Nussbaum, 2015). In short, when workers accomplish a task 
several times, they can complete the same task in a shorter amount of time due to process 
improvements attributable to learning.  
Similarly, contract uniformity achieved by strategic sourcing increases the volume of 
recurring tasks within a larger process which, in the long-run, reduces the total man-hour 
demand at the operational CONS level. For a given requirement, strategically sourced 
contracts bind all operational CONSs, customers, and contractors to a uniform set of 
contractual terms and conditions. Consequently, contracting officers (COs) and vendors are 
not perpetually re-learning the contractual intricacies of different contracts across multiple 
operational CONSs. Government contracting personnel that transition between operational 
CONSs should presumably be familiar with the form and function of any decentrally 
executed, strategically sourced contract awarded at any operational CONS. For the purpose 
of this project, a decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract refers to any operational 
CONS contract executed against a centrally managed, strategically sourced contract. 
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Additionally, contractors that previously managed multiple contracts with varying terms and 
conditions for the same requirement must now only conform to the uniform terms and 
conditions of the master strategically sourced contract. The implications of AFICA-wide 
uniformity are reduced complexity and increased learning through repetition and familiarity, 
which ultimately reduces the man-hour burden of awarding a decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced contract. 
F. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BEST-IN-CLASS ACQUISITION PRACTICES TO 
FEDERAL CONTRACTING 
Best-in-class acquisition practices help achieve contracting efficiencies primarily 
through data-driven demand management. The OMB (2015) defined demand management as 
policies that encourage procurement control and compliance through practices such as 
directing spend through approved acquisition channels in order to eliminate administrative 
costs associated with unnecessary contracting, business transactions, and logistics costs 
throughout the supply chain. In practice, the OMB’s definition of demand management is 
closely aligned with AFICA’s definition of process savings. For the purposes of establishing 
a common understanding of the terms, data-driven demand management is henceforth 
referred to as process savings. 
Operationally, best-in-class process savings practices are expressed in strategically 
sourced contracts through efficient ordering procedures, streamlined PWSs, e-procurement 
platforms, electronic payment, and so on. This project focused on the potential impact of 
efficient e-procurement platforms and expanded Government Purchase Card (GPC) 
purchasing on the process cost of decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts. 
E-procurement generally provides three benefits to an organization’s purchasing 
function: (1) transaction savings (include process savings), (2) increased use of existing 
strategically sourced contracts, and (3) market transparency (Heywood, Barton, Heywood, 
2001). Croom and Brandon-Jones (2005) found that the use of e-procurement platforms in 
the UK achieved process savings in public contracting (although the process savings were 
difficult to quantify). Additionally, e-procurement in the UK public sector was an important 
tool for promoting the use of existing strategically sourced contracts (Croom and Brandon-
Jones, 2005). Unlike UK public procurement, many AFICA strategically sourced contracts 
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are not currently leveraging efficient e-procurement platforms (Reese & Pohlman, 2005). 
GSA’s FSSI website suggests that the government is slowly transitioning to streamlined e-
procurement sites to facilitate simple and effective decentralized ordering (GSA, n.d.).  
GPC use for strategically sourced contracts also provides an efficient purchasing tool 
for operational CONSs. The GPC Expanded Use Initiative incentivizes warranted COs to 
make GPC purchases up to $150,000 on pre-priced commodity contracts, Blanket Purchase 
Agreements (BPAs), and Federal Supply Schedules (FSS; Lyle, 2015). GPC purchases allow 
COs to circumvent the man-hour intensive contract process for pre-priced commodities. The 
implication of efficient e-procurement platforms and expanded GPC purchasing on 
strategically sourced contracts are significant man-hour reductions for operational CONSs. In 
the long-run, AFICA’s strategically sourced services and commodities may be accessible on 
a centrally managed, e-procurement site that accepts GPC purchases up to (or beyond) the 
simplified acquisition threshold (SAT). The private sector has employed this practice for 
many years (Dai & Kauffman, 2000). In the medical community, Group Purchasing 
Organizations (GPOs) provide simple e-procurement platforms that (in some cases) may 
eliminate the need for a dedicated CO (Ebert, 2017). 
The overarching implication of best-in-class procurement efficiencies is that 
theoretically, decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts should incur a lower man-
hour cost than an equivalent open-market contract. For example, a decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced order that leveraged an e-procurement platform and expanded GPC 
purchasing should require less man-hours than an equivalent open-market order executed 
against an operational CONS’s Indefinite-delivery/Indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract. 
Currently, anecdotal evidence suggests that an open-market order probably shares a similar 
man-hour cost to an equivalent decentrally executed, strategically sourced order. This may be 
attributable to a lack of efficient e-procurement platforms and primarily awarding contracts 
instead of leveraging GPC purchasing. This project assumes that over the long-run, 
decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts will achieve appreciable process savings 
over equivalent open-market contracts. 
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G. THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSACTION COST THEORY IN FEDERAL 
CONTRACTING 
Transaction Cost Theory provides a lens to assess federal contracting efficiencies in 
terms of costs. Brown and Potoski (2005) defined transaction costs in public contracting as a 
mechanism to identify “service specific characteristics that affect the efficacy of contracting” 
by analyzing “the costs of negotiating, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts” 
(p. 327). Transaction costs in public contracting are dependent on factors such as the labor 
and time inputs necessary for conducting source selections, contract management, and 
performance monitoring (Pint & Baldwin, 1997). Contracts with high transaction costs are 
typically characterized by complexity, requirement ambiguity, and specialized investments 
(Brown & Potoski, 2005). Conversely, contracts characterized by well-defined requirements 
typically incur fewer transaction costs (Brown & Potoski, 2005).  
Federal policies implicitly corroborate transaction cost theory in federal contracting. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and AFICA Mandatory Procedures implicitly 
demand additional labor and time inputs in the form of research, documentation, and so forth 
for complex requirements and contract actions that increase the government’s risk exposure 
(e.g., sole source contracts).  
Beyond the inherent complexity of a product or service, strategically sourced 
requirements are more complex because they must account for the needs of the entire 
enterprise. A strategically sourced contract must adequately address the individual needs of 
each wing while providing cost, schedule, and performance benefits that exceed what an 
individual CONS could broker independently. Enterprise-wide complexity is further 
exacerbated when complexity is primarily driven by regional variables and statutory 
requirements (e.g., unique wing requirements, small business participation, and so forth). The 
increased complexity and ambiguity of strategically sourced requirements require more man-
hours and higher-level labor inputs which invariably leads to higher transaction costs. 
Conversely, decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts incur substantially 
lower transaction costs because the master strategically sourced contract defined most of the 
product, exchange, and governance rules. Consequently, the time and labor inputs and the 
associated transaction costs for defining the product, exchange, and governance rules for a 
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decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract are significantly lower. Moreover, 
learning efficiencies and best-in-class process savings reduce the transaction cost of 
decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts. 
The claim supported by Transaction Cost Theory and federal contracting policies is 
that factors such as complexity, ambiguity, and risk increase the labor and time inputs 
necessary to execute a contract. Although contracts are not homogenous products, general 
transaction cost inferences can be applied to similar requirements (Brown & Potoski, 2005). 
H. AFPC’S POLICY FOR MANPOWER DETERMINATION 
The following paragraphs contain a discussion of (1) AFPC’s manpower policy and 
(2) the implications of AFPC’s manpower policy on operational CONSs. 
1. Manpower as a Function of Mission Objectives  
AFPC defines a manpower requirement as “the manpower needed to accomplish a 
job, mission, or program … Manpower is not a program by itself which can be manipulated 
apart from the program it supports … [manpower] is sized to reflect the minimum essential 
level to accomplish the required workload” (United States Air Force [USAF], 2014, p. 11). 
Thus, manpower is strictly a function of an organization’s mission. It necessarily follows that 
manpower that exceeds the minimum requirement for a given mission is slack. Conversely, 
manpower that does not meet the minimum requirement for a given mission is insufficient. 
In order to determine the manpower for an organization, AFPC develops manpower 
standards. A manpower standard is “the basic tool used to determine the most effective and 
efficient level of manpower required to support a function. It is a quantitative expression that 
represents a work center’s man-hour requirement in response to varying levels of workload” 
(USAF, 2014, p. 92). The 2014 OC AFMS contains the manpower standards for an 
operational CONS (Carter, 2014). 
It is important to recognize that a minimum manning requirement does not constitute 
insufficient manning. Manpower standards include Man-hour Availability Factors (MAFs) 
and Overload Factors (OLFs) that “account for time away from work center related to leave, 
medical care, education and training (other than on-the-job training), permanent change of 
station (PCS), organizational duties, etc.” (USAF, 2014, p. 17). Although the manpower 
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standard does not contemplate readiness requirements, other Air Force regulations 
supplement manpower in accordance to readiness needs (USAF, 2014). 
2. Implications of AFPC’s Policy 
The implication of AFPC’s manpower policy is that theoretically, all operational 
CONSs are appropriately manned in accordance to their mission profile. In actuality, many 
operational CONSs may be undermanned. This may be due to (1) unfunded manpower 
requirements or (2) poorly defined manpower standards. 
Due to budgetary constraints, AFPC may not allocate the required manpower to an 
operational CONS. If this is the case, an operational CONS is simply undermanned for its 
given mission profile. Although operational CONSs often contain unfunded manpower 
billets, anecdotal evidence suggests that most operational CONS are still capable of meeting 
mission objectives because (1) wing requirements are being met and (2) personnel working 
in operational CONSs are generally not working abnormally long hours to satisfy mission 
requirements. This may not be true for every operational CONS.  
It is also possible that manpower standards do not accurately define the labor 
requirements for a given task. If the manpower standard is inaccurate, an optimized 
manpower solution will not adequately address the manpower needs of an operational 
CONS. This project assumes that AFPC’s manpower standards are accurate. An empirical 
study to validate AFPC’s manpower standards is beyond the scope of this project. 
I. THE 2014 OC AFMS STUDY 
In 2014, the 5MRS conducted a manpower study on operational CONSs. The 
objective of the study was to “develop a manpower standard to be used as a manpower 
determination and allocation tool” (5MRS, 2014, p. 2) based on historical contracting 
workloads and labor and time inputs. The study culminated with a manpower workload tool 
and process flowcharts for AFICA’s most common contracts. Absent from the study were 
process flowcharts and man-hour data for strategically sourced contracts. This omission is 
particularly notable because AFICA’s strategically sourced contracts potentially contain 
process savings that cannot be leveraged through a manpower allocation tool that does not 
account for man-hour savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. 
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Consequently, the manpower output from the AFMS allocation tool does not leverage 
process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. If AFPC determines 
manpower in accordance to the minimum manning required to meet mission objectives, it 
necessarily follows that AFPC’s manpower optimization must contain more manpower than 
an optimized solution that accounts for man-hour reductions for strategically sourced 
contracts. 
J. AFICA’S PRELIMINARY TRANSACTION COST SCHEDULE 
AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule is the agency’s preliminary effort to appraise 
process savings. AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule used the 2014 OC AFMS to develop a 
list of common contract categories and their estimated man-hour demand and transaction 
costs. Refer to Table 1 for AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule. 
Table 1.   AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule. Adapted from C.R. Parson, personal 
communication (May 22, 2017). 
 
Note. The Transaction Cost Comparison Table (see Appendix A) was developed by C.R. Parson at AFICA. 
The comparison table is Parson’s preliminary effort to appraise procurement efficiencies. This is a draft 
version. 
 
Categories Man-hours Rate Transaction Cost
Commodity 475.1 33.02$  15,687.80$          
Commodity Delivery Order 40.25 33.02$  1,329.06$            
Commodity Purchase Order 35.46 33.02$  1,170.89$            
Service 615.08 33.02$  20,309.94$          
Service Task Order 219.66 33.02$  7,253.17$            
Service Purchase Order (Commercial <$150K) 38.37 33.02$  1,266.98$            
Construction 477.92 33.02$  15,780.92$          
Construction Task Order 86.7 33.02$  2,862.83$            
A&E 449.19 33.02$  14,832.25$          
A&E Task Order 145.42 33.02$  4,801.77$            
Sealed Bid 214.13 33.02$  7,070.57$            
Blanket Purchase Agreement 69.1 33.02$  2,281.68$            
Options 22.34 33.02$  737.67$               
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1. Contract Categories 
The 2014 OC AFMS defined the Commodity, Service, Construction, and 
Architecture and Engineering (A&E) contract categories in accordance to their respective 
requirement (Carter, 2014). The definition does not presuppose a specific contract type (e.g., 
firm fixed price), instrument (e.g., IDIQ), or source selection method. These contract 
categories are representative of large, CONS-level procurement efforts greater than or equal 
to $150,000 (Carter, 2014, p. 4).  
Conversely, the Commodity Delivery Order (DO), Commodity Purchased Order 
(PO), Service Task Order (TO), Service PO, Construction TO, and A&E TO contract 
categories are defined by both their requirement and contractual instrument. The Sealed Bid, 
BPA, and Options contract categories are solely defined by the source selection procedure, 
agreement type, or special contracting method used.  
2. Man-Hours 
The 5MRS defined a man-hour as a unit of measuring work that “is equivalent to one 
person working at a normal pace for 60 minutes, two people working at a normal pace for 30 
minutes, or a similar combination of people working at a normal pace for a period of time 
equal to 60 minutes” (Carter, 2014, p. 13). The 5MRS (2014) determined the man-hours for 
each contract category by conducting an “operational audit (OA) using historical records and 
technical estimates” from 17 operational CONS (p. 2).  
3. Wage Rate 
The wage rate is the weighted average of the fully burdened hourly rate of the 
personnel mix in Operational Contracting Functional Account Code (FAC) 12A0 (Carter, 
2014, p. 15). AFICA determined a wage rate of $33.02 for all contract categories (see 
Appendix B for AFICA’s wage rate calculation). 
K. AFICA’S PRELIMINARY TRANSACTION COST COMPARISON TABLE 
The Transaction Cost Comparison Table is a simple tool for forecasting appraised 
transaction cost savings for strategically sourced contracts. The transaction cost of a contract 
mix is compared to the forecasted transaction cost savings of implementing a new 
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strategically sourced contract. The variance between the two transaction costs represents the 
estimated appraised transaction cost savings AFICA may achieve if the strategically sourced 
contract was established and used by operational CONSs (refer to Appendix A for the 
Transaction Cost Comparison Table). Although AFICA’s Transaction Cost Comparison 
Table generates “cash” outputs, the outputs do not represent real savings. The appraised 
transaction cost savings are a notional representation of “cash” savings achieved through a 
strategically sourced contract.  
The primary limitations of AFICA’s Transaction Cost Comparison Table are 
(1) a lack of strategically sourced contract categories, (2) inaccurate transaction costs, and (3) 
nonactionable outputs. 
AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule captures a narrow band of contract categories. 
The lack of stratification is especially important when analyzing transaction cost differences 
between contracts executed against a strategically sourced contract category and an open-
market contract category. For the purposes of this project, an open-market contract category 
is a contract category derived directly from the 2014 OC AFMS. All the contract categories 
listed in AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule are open-market contract categories. Under the 
current construct, AFICA is comparing the transaction cost differences between open-market 
contract categories. Without contract categories capturing the man-hour savings of 
strategically sourced contracts, AFICA cannot ascertain the true transaction cost savings of 
its strategically sourced contracts. 
The transaction costs listed in AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule are probably 
inaccurate due to a misapplication of the wage rate. The wage rate AFICA used is the 
weighted average of the fully burdened hourly rate of the personnel mix in OC FAC 12A0 
(Carter, 2014, p. 15). This weighted average wage rate presupposes that each rank “touches” 
a contract in proportion to the number of members of their rank in the CONS. However, the 
AFMS manpower allocation tool allocates manpower on the basis of historical work unit 
inputs into a given open-market contract category (5MRS, 2014). For example, a complex 
contract may actually have a higher wage rate because more experienced (and expensive) 
work units “touch” the contract more than less experienced (and inexpensive) work units. 
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The 2014 OC AFMS defines a work unit by the individual ranks (e.g., Major [Maj], Senior 
Airman [SrA]) that comprise a work center (Carter 2014).  
Unfortunately, the 2014 OC AFMS does not contain the estimated work unit man-
hour demand for each contract category. In the absence of historical work unit data, 
anecdotal evidence would suggest that large and complex contracts are primarily handled by 
experienced (and typically more expensive) contracting personnel, while simple contracts are 
typically executed by less experienced (and less expensive) personnel. This claim is 
supported by the Operational Contracting Data Questionnaire included in the OC Squadron 
AFMS Development FAC 12A100: Workload Data Collection Plan (5MRS, 2014). Complex 
activities such as conducting a Multi-functional Independent Review Team (MIRT) review 
requires more-experienced work units (e.g., CO and director of business operations), while 
simpler activities, such as processing an invoice, require less-experienced work units (e.g., 
contract specialist; 5MRS, 2014). Consequently, the transaction costs of complex contract 
categories (e.g., service contract) that contain complex activities are likely underestimated, 
while the transaction costs of presumably simpler categories (e.g., service TO) that contain 
less complicated activities are overestimated. 
Lastly, AFICA’s Transaction Cost Comparison Table generates nonactionable 
outputs. As previously mentioned, the transaction cost savings generated from the 
Transaction Cost Comparison Table are appraised process savings. Internal manpower 
optimizations that account for man-hour savings achieved through strategically sourced 
contracts may reveal manpower savings at the operational CONS level that may be used to 
meet other mission objectives. 
L. OPTIMIZING MANPOWER USING A LP 
The following paragraphs contain a discussion on (1) why a LP was used to optimize 
manpower and (2) the theoretical model’s orientation. 
1. Why a LP? 
A LP is a common mathematical modeling tool used extensively in industry for 
business optimization. A LP looks at the current state of the system and the overall objective 
of the system in order to construct “a statement of actions … which will permit the system to 
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move from a given status to a defined objective” (Dantzig, 1963, p. 2). This project used a 
LP to leverage man-hour savings achieved through AFICA’s strategically sourced contracts 
by optimizing the staffing mix of a typical operational CONS. 
2. Model Orientation 
The following paragraphs contain a discussion on why a (1) minimization orientation 
was used and (2) maximization orientation was not used. 
a. Minimization Orientation 
A minimization objective function minimizes manpower with respect to the mission 
(i.e., contracting workload). The proposed theoretical model supports this point of view. By 
definition, “manpower is a limited resource which is sized to reflect the minimum essential 
level to accomplish the required workload” (USAF, 2014, p. 11). If AFICA believes that 
manpower is (1) a limited resource and (2) a function of the mission, AFICA should also 
internally optimize manpower through minimization.  
Additionally, a minimization orientation produces outputs in terms of work unit man-
hours that can be translated to whole people. An internal minimization objective function that 
accounts for process savings will reveal manpower savings in terms of man-hours or whole 
people for each rank. AFICA can clearly identify manpower savings in terms of man-hours 
or whole people for each rank. 
As previously mentioned, AFPC allocates manpower as a function of mission 
objectives (expressed as contract actions for an operational CONS). If AFICA achieves 
internal man-hour savings not accounted for by AFPC, internal AFICA optimizations must 
generate less manpower than AFPC’s optimizations. The difference between AFPC’s and 
AFICA’s manpower optimizations theoretically provide an opportunity for AFICA to 
leverage manpower savings to meet other mission objectives. In short, a minimization 
orientation (1) ensures that mission objectives are met, (2) allows AFICA to leverage internal 
man-hour savings not accounted for by AFPC, and (3) produces manpower savings in terms 
of man-hours or whole people. Constraints in a minimization LP must include readiness 
requirements (as defined by Air Force readiness regulations) and incidental manpower 
requirements such as breaks, sick days, maternity leave, normal working hours, and so forth. 
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An operational CONS’s mission should also account for its forecasted workload and mission 
essential slack. 
Lastly, a minimization objective function also challenges the organizational tendency 
to withhold manpower regardless of mission requirements. If an operational CONS is able to 
meet its mission objectives with its current workforce, simply being able to “produce” more 
with excess manpower does not necessarily constitute a more effective organization. This is 
particularly true for operational CONSs because they are support functions that are 
contingent on wing and readiness requirements. An efficient CONS may simply have less 
work to do if wing and readiness requirements are relatively fixed. As operational CONSs 
achieve more process savings, manpower savings at an operational CONS may be used to 
meet other mission objectives. Operationally, manpower savings may be leveraged by using 
the excess manpower to accomplish mission related tasks within the CONS, accomplish 
AFICA taskers, or meet a variety of other mission objectives. 
The LP proposed by this project used the framework of the classic production mix 
problem to optimize manpower (Dantzig, 1963, p. 50). Unlike the classic production mix 
problem, the proposed LP defines the “production mix” as the manpower mix necessary to 
execute a given contracting workload. Typically, manpower is expressed as a constraint for 
optimizing a production mix. 
b. Maximization Orientation 
An alternative model orientation is to maximize production. A maximization model 
considers an operational CONS’s workforce and maximizes contracting production in terms 
of contract outputs (i.e., how many commodity contracts, service contracts, etc., can an 
operational CONS produce?). This orientation decouples mission requirements from 
manpower. The fundamental question should not be how much contract production can an 
operational CONS generate but does that production meet wing and readiness requirements? 
In accordance with AFPC’s manpower definition, manpower should be strictly optimized in 
respect to the wing’s requirements, readiness needs, and incidental manpower requirements 
such as leave and additional duties (USAF, 2014). 
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A maximization LP may provide a basis to quantify an operational CONS’s readiness 
(e.g., the more a given workforce can produce, the more readiness it may provide). Although 
contract production may be used as a readiness indicator, “production” (in terms of contract 
actions) is an abstract way to think about readiness. Air Force readiness requirements are 
generally described in terms of Unit Type Codes (UTCs) that describe a specific personnel 
(or asset) capability (USAF, 2001). Combatant commanders do not deploy contract 
production (i.e., 15 commodity contracts, 20 service contracts, etc.), they deploy UTCs (1 
Maj, 3 SSgts, etc.). Contract production must be interpreted to represent things like readiness, 
quality, etc., to describe the effects on the mission.   
Conversely, if readiness is a required mission set of an operational CONS, readiness 
requirements should be included as a constraint in a minimization model (similar to how 
AFPC accounts for readiness). This ensures that the right quantity and mix of UTCs are 
available to meet readiness requirements. Moreover, a minimization model may also buffer 
against unknown readiness requirements by adding additional constraints to account for 
deployment surges. 
Lastly, a maximization model does not consider slack because it presupposes that 
personnel is always gainfully employed. It may be the case that an operational CONS with 
excess capacity is simply less busy. If an operational CONS is capable of exceeding wing 
and readiness requirements, it may be beneficial for AFICA to consider using the excess 
capacity to meet other mission objectives (if the excess capacity is not already being used 
within the CONS).  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Chapter III details the methods and processes used to answer the research question 
posed by the project. Chapter III contains the (1) framework for analysis, (2) the 
methodology used to develop the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule and theoretical 
manpower optimization model, and (3) the methodology used to optimize a notional 
operational CONS. 
A. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION IN 
AFICA 
The literature review informed the following theoretical framework for manpower 
optimization in AFICA: 
1. AFPC manpower optimizations do not include man-hour savings attributable 
to strategically sourced contracts. Assume AFICA manpower optimizations 
include man-hour savings attributable to strategically sourced contracts.  
2. If AFPC determines manpower in accordance to the minimum manning 
required to meet mission objectives, AFPC’s optimized manpower level must 
be more than AFICA’s optimized manpower level. 
3. If items one and two are true, the implication is that operational CONSs may 
have excess manpower that may be used to accomplish other mission 
objectives. 
4. As AFICA continues to achieve more man-hour savings through strategically 
sourced contracts, AFICA may achieve more manpower savings that may be 
used to accomplish other mission objectives. 
To reiterate, this study is interested in exploring one central question: How can 
AFICA leverage process savings to identify manpower savings that may be used to address 
other mission objectives?  
To achieve this objective, the project segments the research into two distinct phases. 
Phase I of the project analyzes AFICA’s transaction cost data and estimated labor and time 
inputs to develop a Revised Transaction Cost Schedule and theoretical LP for manpower 
optimization. Phase I consists of two steps: (1) developing the Revised Transaction Cost 
Schedule and (2) developing a theoretical LP for manpower optimization.  
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Phase II of the project used the theoretical LP to demonstrate how AFICA may be 
able to internally optimize manpower. Phase II consists of three steps: (1) simulating AFPC’s 
manpower optimization for a notional operational CONS, (2) simulating AFICA’s internal 
manpower optimization, and (3) analyzing the manpower variance between the two 
optimized solutions. The manpower variance between the two optimized solutions is excess 
manpower that may be used to meet other mission objectives. 
B. PHASE I 
1. Developing the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule 
The Revised Transaction Cost Schedule incorporates the following modifications to 
AFICA’s Transaction Cost Schedule: (1) new strategically sourced contract categories, (2) 
the corresponding man-hour demand for the new strategically sourced contract categories, 
and (3) a differentiated wage rate based on contract complexity. 
a. Additional Contract Categories 
In addition to adding categories for strategically sourced contracts, this project 
included the “Modification” and “Close-out” Contract Categories contained in the 2014 OC 
AFMS (Carter, 2014). The inclusion of these categories provides a more holistic analysis of 
the true transaction costs of executing an operational CONS’s workload. 
b. Determining the Man-Hour Demand of the Strategically Sourced Contract 
Categories 
To determine the man-hour demand of the new strategically sourced contract 
categories, the project (1) established a man-hour baseline for the new strategically sourced 
contract categories and (2) applied a man-hour discount to the new strategically sourced 
contract categories. In the absence of historical data, the 5MRS (2014) proposed the use of 
estimates to determine the man-hour demand of a contract. A distinct advantage of this 
project is the availability of empirically developed man-hour data for open-market contract 
categories. The man-hour requirements for the new strategically sourced contract categories 
are derivations from existing open-market man-hour data.  
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First, the man-hour baselines for the strategically sourced contract categories were 
established by analyzing comparable open-market contract categories. For example, a 
decentrally executed, strategically sourced commodity contract is probably most like an 
open-market DO. If a CO generally follows the same steps for executing each contract, it 
follows that the man-hour relationship may also have close similarities. 
Next, the man-hours of the new strategically sourced contract categories were 
discounted to account for learning and best-in-class acquisition practices. This project 
assumes that in the long-run, decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract categories 
are less man-hour intensive than their comparable open-market contract categories due to 
best-in-class acquisition practices and enterprise-wide learning (refer to Chapter I). Due to 
the time and resource limitations of this project, a comprehensive OA based on historical 
records was not conducted to determine the man-hour requirements of the new strategically 
sourced contract categories.  
c. Developing Differentiated Wage Rates to Determine Transaction Costs 
To determine the transaction costs for each contract category, this project established 
differentiated wage rates based on contract complexity. The transaction cost for each contract 
category is the product of the contract category’s man-hours and its applicable wage rate. 
The 5MRS (2014) primarily used “historical records, such as data system reports or 
queries, electronic file system documentation, or documentation contained in physical 
records/files” (p. 2) to determine the appropriate work unit mix for a contract category. Due 
to the resource and time limitations of this project, quantifiable historical data was not 
collected to develop a work unit mix for each strategically sourced contract category. Despite 
these limitations, this project used Brown and Potoski’s (2015) research on transaction cost 
theory in public contracting to make logical estimates regarding the transaction costs of 
different contract categories based on contract complexity. This project assigned work unit 
man-hour inputs based on the complexity of the contract category. Complex contract 
categories (i.e., those with more complex activities) required more experienced (and 
expensive) work units. Conversely, less complex contract categories (i.e., those with less 
complex activities) used less experienced (and less expensive) work units. The work units 
were derived from the work centers in the manpower study (Carter, 2014). The transaction 
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cost for each contract category was determined by multiplying the contract category’s man-
hours by the appropriate wage rate. 
d. Limitations of the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule 
The primary limitations of the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule were an 
overreliance on estimates to (1) determine the man-hour requirements for the new 
strategically sourced contract categories and (2) develop the differentiated wage rates. 
The man-hour requirements for the new strategically sourced contract categories were 
derived using logical inferences from the existing man-hour data contained in the 2014 OC 
AFMS (Carter, 2014). Consequently, the man-hour requirements for the new strategically 
sourced contract categories were not independently determined by surveying multiple 
operational CONSs. It may be possible that this project overestimates or underestimates the 
man-hour requirements for the new strategically sourced contract categories. For the 
purposes of establishing a theoretical framework for internal manpower optimization, it is not 
necessary that the man-hours for the strategically sourced contract categories are accurate. 
The work unit man-hour inputs for each contract category were based on the 
perceived complexity of the category. Although the 5MRS linked complex activities 
(requiring more expensive work units) with more complex contracts, the actual work unit 
man-hour inputs for each contract category were not published in the 2014 OC AFMS 
(Carter, 2014). Consequently, this project may overestimate or underestimate the work unit 
man-hour inputs for each contract category. For the purposes of establishing a theoretical 
framework for internal manpower optimization, it is not necessary that the work unit labor 
inputs for the strategically sourced contract categories are accurate. 
2. Developing the Theoretical LP 
The objective of the LP is to provide a theoretical framework to optimize manpower 
with respect to process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. The LP is a 
derivation of the classic production problem. The LP used the data from the Revised 
Transaction Cost Schedule and the 2014 OC AFMS. Refer to Chapter IV, Section B for the 
mathematical expression of the LP. 
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Although the proposed theoretical model is a LP, the relationship between the work 
unit man-hours for the various contract categories and the workcenter cost is non-linear 
because the optimized man-hours for each work unit is rounded up to the nearest whole 
person. Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration of how optimized work unit man-hours are 
rounded up to nearest whole person. 
a. Defining the Problem 
The first step of the LP is to define the problem: Given a contracting workload, what 
is the optimal work unit mix that minimizes cost? This project presupposes that the optimal 
work unit mix is the least expensive work center that can execute a given contracting 
workload. Additional work units beyond the optimized work unit mix is considered slack.  
b. Defining the Decision Variables 
The decision variables represent the work units (expressed in variables) that the LP 
optimizes. This project used the work unit identified in the 2014 OC AFMS as the decision 
variables (Carter, 2014). Refer to Table 2 for the work units and their assigned decision 
variables.  
Accurately defining the decision variables is not essential for establishing the 
theoretical basis for leveraging process savings through internal manpower optimization. 
Regardless of the decision variables used, internal optimizations that account for man-hour 
savings should generate less manpower than AFPC’s optimizations that do not consider man-
hour savings for strategically sourced contracts. An actionable manpower optimization model 
should consider civilians as well as military members. 
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Table 2.    Operational Contracting FAC 12A0 Work Center Structure with 
Assigned Decision Variables. Adapted from Carter (2014). 
 
 
c. Defining the Objective Function 
The objective function is the mathematical expression of the stated problem: Given a 
contracting workload, what is the optimal work unit mix that minimizes cost? The optimal 
work unit mix is derived from the optimized work unit man-hour solution. Refer to Figure 1 
for an illustration of the objective function.  
 
Figure 1.  The Objective Function 
  
RANK DECISION VARIABLES
Major (Maj) Let "A" equal the number of Maj man-hours
Captain (Capt) Let "B" equal the number of Capt man-hours
Lieutenant (Lt) Let "C" equal the number of Lt man-hours
Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) Let "D" equal the number of CMSgt man-hours
Senior Master Sergeant (SMSgt) Let "E" equal the number of SMSgt man-hours
Master Sergeant (MSgt) Let "F" equal the number of MSgt man-hours
Technical Sergeant (TSgt) Let "G" equal the number of TSgt man-hours
Staff Sergeant (SSgt) Let "H" equal the number of SSgt man-hours
Senior Airman (SrA) Let "I" equal the number of SrA man-hours
Airman First Class (A1C) Let "J" equal the number of A1C man-hours
WORKCENTER
1) Minimize the Output of the Objective Function
2)  Decision Variable Coefficients
3) Decision Variables
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(1) Minimize the Output of the Objective Function 
The goal of the objective function is to minimize the total work center cost while 
satisfying the manpower requirements of a given contracting workload. The sum product of 
the objective function represents the least expensive work unit mix necessary to execute a 
given contracting workload. 
(2) Decision Variable Coefficients 
The coefficient of each decision variable is the fully burdened hourly wage rate of 
each work unit. The fully burdened hourly rate of each work unit is contained in AFICA’s 
wage rate calculation (Appendix B). 
(3) Converting Man-Hours to Work Units 
Each decision variable is expressed in man-hours. Although the problem statement 
necessitates an integer solution for each decision variable (e.g., 1 Maj, 3 SrA), the LP 
initially optimizes each decision variable according to man-hours. The integer work unit 
solution is derived by dividing the optimized work unit man-hours by 1,463.6 work hours. 
The 1,463.6 contracting work hour standard represents the dedicated contracting production 
time available to each work unit per year. The 1,463.6 contracting work hour standard was 
calculated by discounting the 2,087 annual work hour standard by 30% to account for non-
contract production time used for mandatory and discretionary activities such as military 
training, work breaks, physical training, and additional duties.   
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM; 2017) defines 2,087 work hours as the 
annual work hour standard for a federal employee. Although military members are generally 
not constrained by fixed work hours, the 2014 OC AFMS study presupposes that (on 
average) “Operational Contracting Squadrons are manned eight hours per day, five days per 
week, excluding holidays” (5MRS, 2014, p. 7). Refer to Figure 2 for an illustration of how 
the optimized work unit man-hours are converted to work units. 
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Figure 2.  How Work Unit Man-Hours Are Converted to Work Units 
d. Defining the Constraints 
The constraints provide the basis for the LP to determine how many work units (i.e., 
Maj, SrA, etc.) are needed to successfully execute a given contracting workload. Each 
constraint is defined by a contract category. Refer to Figure 3 for an illustration of how a 
constraint is defined in the LP. 
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Figure 3.  The Constraint Structure for Each Contract Category 
(1) Total Man-Hour Constraint for a Contract Category 
For each contract category, the total work unit man-hours must be greater than or 
equal to the total man-hour demand of a given contract category. The left-hand side of the 
constraint is the sum of all work unit man-hours. The right-hand side of the constraint is the 
total man-hour demand for a given contract category. The total man-hour demand for a given 
contract category is defined by the product of the man-hour demand of a given contract 
category and the total quantity of contracts allocated to the contract category. For example, a 
single commodity contract requires 475.1 man-hours. If the quantity of commodity contracts 
Commodity Contract Category
A + B + C + D + E + F + G + H + I + J ≥ 475.1 * 51
A ≥ .15 * 475.1 * 5




J ≥ .01 * 475.1 * 5
2
MAJ 15.00% MAJ 1.00%
CPT 30.00% CPT 1.00%
LT 1.00% LT 10.00%
CMSGT 1.00% CMSGT 1.00%
SMSGT 1.00% SMSGT 1.00%
MSGT 27.00% MSGT 10.00%
TSGT 22.00% TSGT 10.00%
SSGT 1.00% SSGT 21.00%
SRA 1.00% SRA 25.00%
A1C 1.00% A1C 20.00%
MAJ 1.00% MAJ 1.00%
CPT 1.00% CPT 1.00%
LT 10.00% LT 10.00%
CMSGT 1.00% CMSGT 1.00%
SMSGT 1.00% SMSGT 1.00%
MSGT 5.00% MSGT 1.00%
TSGT 6.00% TSGT 5.00%
SSGT 15.00% SSGT 5.00%
SRA 20.00% SRA 25.00%




Commodity DO/PO Strategically Sourced 
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assumes a value of five, the total work unit man-hours must be greater than or equal to 
2,375.5 man-hours. 
(2) Individual Work Unit Constraints for a Contract Category 
For each contract category, each work unit’s man-hours must be greater than or equal 
to the work unit’s man-hour contribution to a given contract category. The left-hand side of 
the constraint is the work unit’s man-hours. The right-hand side of the constraint is the work 
unit’s man-hour contribution for a given contract category. A work unit’s man-hour 
contribution is defined by the product of the work unit’s percent contribution, the man-hour 
demand of a given contract category, and the total quantity of contracts allocated to the 
contract category. The sum of the individual work unit man-hour contributions must be equal 
to the product of the man-hour demand of a given contract category and the total quantity of 
contracts allocated to the contract category. 
For example, a commodity contract category requires 475.1 man-hours. If the 
commodity contract category is considered “complex,” the contribution of each work unit is 
distributed in accordance to the “complex” contribution table depicted in Figure 3. A Maj 
contributes approximately 92.3 hours (15%), a Capt contributes approximately 184.5 hours 
(30%), and so on per commodity contract. Each rank’s man-hour contribution must be 
greater than or equal to each respective rank’s man-hour requirement for a given quantity of 
commodity contracts. Refer to Chapter IV, Section A, Subsection d for an analysis of how 
the percent contribution for each work unit was determined. 
(3) Work Units and the “Team Concept” 
Each constraint presupposes that each work unit is necessary to execute a contract 
category regardless of the contract category’s complexity. The logical basis for this 
assumption is that each work unit is co-dependent on all the other work units to execute a 
contract. For example, a simple contract category may use more inexperienced (and 
inexpensive) work units and leverage (to a lesser degree) the contracting expertise of more 
experienced (and expensive) work units. Operationally, this may be expressed when airmen 
ask their supervisors questions concerning the execution of a simple contract category. 
Although the more experienced work units may not directly “touch” a contract category, their 
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presence was necessary for contract execution. However, as a percentage of actual man-hour 
inputs into a simple contract category, the more experienced (and expensive) work units 
represent a much smaller proportion of the total man-hour requirement of a simple contract 
category. The application of the work unit man-hour contribution for each constraint captures 
the “team” dynamic. 
e. Limitations of the Theoretical LP 
The primary limitations of the theoretical LP are an inability to account for (1) 
nonproduction-related manpower requirements and (2) civilians. The theoretical LP does not 
include constraints to account for important manpower factors such as statutory manning 
requirements and required manpower levels for readiness as defined by the MAF, OLF, and 
USAF readiness regulations. The theoretical LP exclusively optimizes manpower on the 
basis of contracting productivity. Despite these limitations, accurately defining the 
constraints is not essential for establishing the theoretical basis for leveraging process savings 
through internal manpower optimization. At a minimum, the constraints must capture 
notional man-hour savings for strategically sourced contract categories. 
The theoretical model does not contain decision variables for civilians. An actionable 
model must account for civilians because they are an integral part of the operation of a 
typical operational CONS. However, including civilians in this theoretical model is 
immaterial to demonstrate how process savings may impact manpower at the operational 
CONS level.   
As previously mentioned, the theoretical LP is not meant to replace the manpower 
allocation tool developed by the 5MRS. The theoretical LP provides a rudimentary tool to 
mathematically test the manpower implications of leveraging process savings achieved 
through strategically sourced contracts. Additional studies are required to determine the 
actual man-hour demand of strategically sourced contracts. 
C. PHASE II 
The goal of Phase II is to demonstrate how AFICA may identify excess manpower 
that may be used to address other mission objectives. To achieve this objective, stylized 
contract data loosely built from the 28 CONS’s fiscal year (FY) 2016 contract portfolio was 
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used to optimize manpower with respect to man-hour savings achieved through strategically 
sourced contracts. The 28 CONS contract portfolio provided the allocation basis for 
determining how many contracts should be allocated to each contract category for the 
notional operational CONS.  
For purposes of simulating manpower savings, accurate contract data is not 
necessary. Each operational CONS has a unique contract workload that may be optimized at 
the CONS level to determine optimal manning. At a minimum, the stylized data should 
represent a probable distribution of contract categories for an operational CONS.  
1. Simulating AFPC’s Manpower Optimization for a Notional Operational 
CONS 
The purpose of this step is to simulate how the AFPC would presently assign contract 
actions. Regardless of how many strategically sourced contract actions a given CONS 
executes in a FY, the AFMS manpower allocation tool cannot account for man-hour savings 
achieved through strategically sourced contracts because the allocation tool does not 
presently account for strategically sourced contract categories. 
After assigning the contract actions to the appropriate open-market contract 
categories, the theoretical LP was used to optimize manpower. The optimized manpower 
solution represents an approximation of the manpower output generated by AFPC. 
2. Simulating AFICA’s Internal Manpower Optimization 
In order to determine the optimal manpower mix of an operational CONS that uses 
strategically sourced contracts, the contract data for the notional operational CONS was 
assigned open-market and strategically sourced contract categories contained in the Revised 
Transaction Cost Schedule. The purpose of this step is to simulate how AFICA may 
internally optimize manpower to account for process savings achieved through strategically 
sourced contracts. The FY2016 28 CONS contract data was used as the allocation basis for 
assigning strategically sourced contract categories. 
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After assigning the contract actions to the appropriate open-market and strategically 
sourced contract categories, the LP was used to optimize manpower. The optimized 
manpower solution represents manpower savings that may be achieved by leveraging man-
hour savings generated by strategically sourced contracts. 
3. Analyzing the Variance between the Two Optimized Manpower Solutions 
The variance between the two optimized manpower solutions is the manpower 
savings AFICA may achieve if AFPC actually funded all manpower billets. Even if there is 
no opportunity to leverage excess contracting capacity, at a minimum, the internal 
optimization provides a better representation of an operational CONS’s contracting capacity 
because it accounts for process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. 
Refer to Table 3 for the Manpower Variance Table.  
Table 3.   Comparative Manpower Analysis Table 
 
The man-hours included in this table are for illustrative purposes only. 
 
a. Manpower Savings 
The manpower savings represent the work units that AFICA may use to address other 
mission objectives. The optimized work unit difference between the solution with “no 
strategically sourced spend” and with “strategically sourced spend” represent the manpower 
savings. Refer to Table 3 for an illustration of how manpower savings are calculated. AFICA 
MAJ CAPT LT CMSGT SMSGT MSGT TSGT SSGT SRA A1C
Optimized Man-
Hours
1500 3000 3000 200 200 4200 4200 4200 4200 4200 Work Center Cost per FY
(if work units paid by the hour)
Fully Burdened 
Rate per Hour
$58.53 $48.42 $35.74 $50.82 $50.82 $42.68 $38.19 $33.33 $28.28 $23.03 $1,055,802.37
Optimal 
Personnel Mix
1 2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 Work Center Cost per FY
Anuual Wage 122,157.62$     101,052.11$   74,585.25$      106,061.34$     106,060.18$     89,072.87$      79,712.53$     69,560.87$      59,030.22$      48,072.74$      $1,647,316.27
Optimized Man-
Hours
1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 Work Center Cost per FY
(if work units paid by the hour)
Fully Burdened 
Rate per Hour
$58.53 $48.42 $35.74 $50.82 $50.82 $42.68 $38.19 $33.33 $28.28 $23.03 $863,067.76
Optimal 
Personnel Mix
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 Work Center Cost per FY
Anuual Wage 122,157.62$     101,052.11$   74,585.25$      106,061.34$     106,060.18$     89,072.87$      79,712.53$     69,560.87$      59,030.22$      48,072.74$      $1,200,814.94
Manpower 
Savings
















































Optimized Manpower difference between "No Strategic 
Source Spend" and  "With Strategic Source Spend" 
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may also analyze the work unit man-hour difference between the two optimized solutions to 
determine excess contracting capacity (in man-hours). 
b. Using the Excess Manpower to Meet Other Mission Requirements 
The optimized manpower solution does not tell AFICA where it should allocate the 
excess manpower. AFICA leadership must make managerial decisions regarding where the 
excess manpower may be best utilized. Possibilities include allowing operational CONS 
commanders to gainfully employ its own workforce, assigning AFICA taskers to operational 
CONSs with excess contracting capacity, or reassigning personnel to undermanned 
operational CONSs, ESSs, or SCONSs. Chapter VI addresses these possibilities in detail. 
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IV. PHASE I FINDINGS 
Chapter IV contains the (1) Revised Transaction Cost Schedule and (2) theoretical 
manpower optimization model. Both products were developed using the methodology 
detailed in the Chapter III. 
A. THE REVISED TRANSACTION COST SCHEDULE 
Refer to Table 4 for the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule.  
Table 4.   Revised Transaction Cost Schedule 
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First, strategically sourced contract categories were developed from the open-market 
contract categories. Next, man-hour baselines for the strategically sourced contract categories 
were developed based on the man-hour relationships between the open-market and 
strategically sourced contract categories. The man-hour baselines for the strategically 
sourced contracts provide the starting point to apply discounts for process savings 
attributable to best-in-class acquisition practices and enterprise-wide learning. 
1. Determining the Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Contract 
Categories 
The following decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract categories were 
developed from the open-market contract categories contained in the 2014 OC AFMS 
(Carter, 2014). The strategically sourced contract categories are: 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Commodity  
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial greater than 
$150,000) 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial greater than 
$150,000) 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Construction  
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced A&E  
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced BPA  
 
2. Establishing Man-Hour Baselines for the Decentrally Executed, 
Strategically Sourced Contract Categories 
The man-hour baselines for the decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract 
categories provide the starting point to apply discounts for process savings attributable to 
best-in-class acquisition practices and learning. Many decentrally executed, strategically 
sourced contracts share a strict IDIQ/order relationship. For example, COs contract for 
medical professionals by awarding TOs against the master Clinical Acquisition for Support 
Services (CLASS) IDIQ contract. Under this construct, each decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced IDIQ order functions like an open-market IDIQ order. The most logical 
inference is that (on average) each decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract 
category should be (at most) as process-intensive as its comparable open-market contract 
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category. Consequently, the man-hour demand of a comparable open-market contract is a 
good starting baseline for establishing the man-hour demand for a decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced contract. 
3. Discounting the Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Contract 
Categories 
The man-hour demand for each decentrally executed, strategically sourced contract is 
60% of its comparable open-market contract category. The 40% discount represents the 
process savings achieved through learning and best-in-class acquisition practices discussed in 
the literature review. The 40% discount is an arbitrary value that may not reflect the actual 
process savings achieved through using a strategically sourced contract. At a minimum, the 
discount addresses the premise that decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts 
should be more process-efficient than their comparable open-market contract categories. 
Although few (if any) decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts currently 
reap the full process savings of best-in-class e-procurement platforms, expanded GPC 
purchasing, and enterprise-wide learning, this project assumes that, in the long-run, all 
strategically sourced contracts will reap these process savings. 
a. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Commodity  
40.25 hours (Commodity DO) * 0.6 = 24.15 hours 
b. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial>$150K)  
219.66 hours (Service TO) * 0.6 = 131.796 hours 
c. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial<$150K)  
38.37 hours (Service PO (Commercial < $150,000)) * 0.6 = 23 hours 
d. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Construction  
86.7 hours (Construction TO) * 0.6 = 60.69 hours 
e. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced A&E  
145.42 hours (A&E TO) * 0.6 = 101.794 hours 
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f. Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced BPA  
69.1 hours (BPA) * 0.6 = 41.46 hours 
4. Determining the Applied Wage Rates 
In accordance with Brown and Potoski’s (2015) research on transaction cost theory in 
public contracting, contracts with high transaction costs are typically characterized by 
complexity, requirement ambiguity, and specialized investments. Conversely, contracts 
characterized by well-defined requirements typically incur fewer transaction costs (Brown & 
Potoski, 2015). To reflect this dynamic, the following wage rates were developed: (1) 
“complex wage rate,” (2) “service, construction, A&E TO/PO wage rate,” (3) “commodity 
DO/PO wage rate,” and (4) “strategically sourced commodity wage rate.” Each wage rate is 
the sum product of the percent contribution of each work unit and the work unit’s fully 
burdened hourly rate. Refer to Table 5 for an illustration of how each wage rate was 
calculated. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 43 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Table 5.   Wage Rate Calculation Table 
 
Fully Burdened Hourly Rate
MAJ 15.00% * $58.53 = $8.78
CPT 30.00% * $48.42 = $14.53
LT 1.00% * $35.74 = $0.36
CMSGT 1.00% * $50.82 = $0.51
SMSGT 1.00% * $42.68 = $0.43
MSGT 27.00% * $38.19 = $10.31
TSGT 22.00% * $33.33 = $7.33
SSGT 1.00% * $28.28 = $0.28
SRA 1.00% * $23.03 = $0.23
A1C 1.00% * $17.84 = $0.18
Complex Wage Rate = $42.94
MAJ 1.00% * $58.53 = $0.59
CPT 1.00% * $48.42 = $0.48
LT 10.00% * $35.74 = $3.57
CMSGT 1.00% * $50.82 = $0.51
SMSGT 1.00% * $42.68 = $0.43
MSGT 10.00% * $38.19 = $3.82
TSGT 10.00% * $33.33 = $3.33
SSGT 21.00% * $28.28 = $5.94
SRA 25.00% * $23.03 = $5.76
A1C 20.00% * $17.84 = $3.57
Simple Wage Rate = $28.00
MAJ 1.00% * $58.53 = $0.59
CPT 1.00% * $48.42 = $0.48
LT 10.00% * $35.74 = $3.57
CMSGT 1.00% * $50.82 = $0.51
SMSGT 1.00% * $42.68 = $0.43
MSGT 5.00% * $38.19 = $1.91
TSGT 6.00% * $33.33 = $2.00
SSGT 15.00% * $28.28 = $4.24
SRA 20.00% * $23.03 = $4.61
A1C 40.00% * $17.84 = $7.14
Strategic Source Wage Rate = $25.47
MAJ 1.00% * $58.53 = $0.59
CPT 1.00% * $48.42 = $0.48
LT 10.00% * $35.74 = $3.57
CMSGT 1.00% * $50.82 = $0.51
SMSGT 1.00% * $42.68 = $0.43
MSGT 1.00% * $38.19 = $0.38
TSGT 5.00% * $33.33 = $1.67
SSGT 5.00% * $28.28 = $1.41
SRA 25.00% * $23.03 = $5.76
A1C 50.00% * $17.84 = $8.92
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a. Complex Wage Rate 
The “complex” wage rate reflects the cost of the more experienced (and expensive) 
work units required for complex contract categories. As a percent of total work unit man-
hour inputs, more experienced work units (i.e., Maj and Capt) represent a larger proportion of 
work unit man-hour inputs into a given “complex” contract category. Although the 2014 OC 
AFMS did not publish the individual work unit man-hour inputs into a given contract 
category, contract categories such as Commodity, Service, and Construction contracts 
contained complex activities such as Acquisition Strategy Panel (ASP) Briefings, Major 
Command (MAJCOM) Reviews, and market research for complex requirements (Carter, 
2014). Complex contracts typically necessitate more experienced work units throughout the 
contracting process. 
The complex wage rate was applied to: 
• Commodity Contract (Commercial > $150,000 or Master Strategically 
Sourced Contract)  
• Service Contract (Commercial > $150,000 or Master Strategically Sourced 
Contract),  
• Construction (> $150,000 or Master Strategically Sourced Contract),  
• A&E (> $150,000 or Master Strategically Sourced Contract)  
 
b. Service, Construction, and A&E TO/PO Wage Rate 
The “service, construction, and A&E TO/PO wage rate” reflects the cost of the work 
unit inputs required for service, construction, and A&E TOs and POs. Service, construction, 
and A&E TOs and POs are less complex than their respective master contracts because the 
master contracts have defined most of the service, exchange, and governance terms. 
Consequently, in respect to the master contracts, TOs and POs require lower skill level work 
units for execution and management. However, due the inherent complexity of service, 
construction, and A&E requirements, TOs and POs typically require higher level work unit 
inputs than a commodity DO. For example, the strategically sourced Roof Replacement and 
Repair contract presents considerably more complexity and risk than a commodity DO 
because the requirement complexity is largely driven by regional variables (e.g., the 
condition of the existing roof) that cannot be mitigated by the contract. Conversely, 
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commodity DOs are inherently less complex and risky because commodity requirement 
complexity can generally be mitigated by defining the product specifications in the master 
contract. 
The “service, construction, and A&E TO/PO wage rate” was applied to:  
• Service TO 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial > 
$150,000) 
• Service PO (Commercial < $150,000) 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial < 
$150,000) 
• Construction TO 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Construction  
• A&E TO 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced A&E 
 
c. Commodity DO/PO Wage Rate 
The “commodity DO/PO wage rate” reflects the cost of less experienced (and 
inexpensive) work units required for commodity DOs and POs. As a percent of total work 
unit man-hour inputs, less experienced work units (i.e., A1C, SrA, SSgt) represent a larger 
proportion of work unit man-hour inputs into a given commodity DO or PO. Although the 
2014 OC AFMS did not publish the individual work unit man-hour inputs into a given 
contract category, contract categories such as the Commodity PO contained simple activities 
such as market research for low-dollar items and oral solicitations (Carter, 2014). 
Commodity DOs and POs typically necessitate less experienced work units throughout the 
contracting process. This project assumed that the BPA and Sealed Bid categories also 
assumed this wage rate since both (1) may be used for commodities or services and (2) are 
generally used for simpler procurements. 
The “commodity DO/PO wage rate” was applied to:  
• Commodity DO 
• Commodity PO 
• BPA 
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• Sealed Bid 
 
d. Strategically Sourced Commodity Contract Wage Rate 
The “strategically sourced commodity contract wage rate” reflects the cost of the least 
experienced (and most inexpensive) work units required for decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced commodity contracts. As a percent of total work unit man-hour inputs, 
less experienced work units (i.e., A1C and SrA) represent the largest proportion of work unit 
man-hour inputs into a given simple contract category. Relative to other contract categories, 
decentrally executed, strategically sourced commodity contracts typically represent the 
lowest risk procurement vehicles because (1) the master strategically sourced commodity 
contract generally defines the product, exchange, and governance rules in whole and (2) 
commodities are generally less complex requirements. 
For example, the master Air Force Way (AFWay) contract is a robust strategically 
sourced contract that clearly defines product, exchange, and governance rules. The products 
(e.g., computers, printers, and IT hardware) and their associated specifications (e.g., CPU, 
processor speed, RAM) are strictly defined in the product list. The cost of each product and 
the method of payment is also strictly defined. Lastly, the terms and conditions clearly spell 
out how the buyer and seller will interact during the course of the contract. Each 
decentralized AFWay order is a relatively low risk procurement because the contract is 
complete in nature. COs will typically assign low-risk procurements to less experienced 
members because there is a low probability of failure. This project assumed that the 
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced BPA, Options, Modifications, and Closeouts 
also required the least expensive work units for execution. The “strategically sourced 
commodity wage rate” was applied to: 
• Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Commodity 
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e. Work Unit Estimates 
The “complex wage rate,” “service, construction, and A&E TO/PO wage rate,” 
“commodity DO/PO wage rate,” and the “strategically sourced commodity wage rate” work 
unit man-hour estimates are only meant to reflect the relative work unit man-hour demand as 
a function of contract complexity.  
The CMSgt and SMSgt work units were assigned a one percent work unit 
contribution for all wage rates. CMSgts and SMSgts typically assume supervisory roles that 
are not directly involved in contract production. Consequently, the size of a given contract 
workload will have very little impact on the overall manpower demand for CMSgts and 
SMSgts. 
B. THE MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
The objective of the theoretical manpower optimization model is to leverage process 
saving through manpower optimization. The mathematical expression of the LP is displayed 
below. Refer to Appendix C for the long notation of the manpower optimization model. 
1. Variables and Definitions 
Let: 
Xi = annual man-hours per unit; where “i” is: A = MAJ, B = CAPT… J = AIC 
 
Yc = Required man-hours for each contract type; where “c” is: 1 = Commodity, 2 = 
Commodity DO … 21 = Closeouts 
 
Qc = Annual demand for each contract type; where “c” is: 1 = Commodity, 2 = Commodity 
DO… 21 = Closeouts 
 
Zij = Contribution percentage of each unit for each contract type; where “i” is: A = MAJ,  
 
B = CAPT… J = AIC; and “j” is: 1 = Complex, 2 = Service, Construction, A&E TO/PO,  
 
3 = Commodity DO/PO, and 4 = Strategically Sourced Commodity 
 
(Refer to Table 5 for the work unit contribution percentages for “complex,” “simple,” and 
“strategic source” contract categories) 
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2. Objective Function 
Min: 58.53XA + 48.42XB + 35.74XC + 50.82XD + 42.68XE + 38.19XF + 33.33XG + 28.28XH 
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V. PHASE II FINDINGS 
Chapter V contains the manpower optimization results of the notional operational 
CONS. The theoretical manpower optimization model developed in Chapter IV was used to 
optimize the manpower of the notional operational CONS. 
A. SIMULATING AFPC’S MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION FOR A NOTIONAL 
OPERATIONAL CONS 
This step simulated how the AFPC would assign manpower since AFPC does not 
account for process savings achieved through strategically sourced contracts. First, stylized 
contract data was developed for optimization. 
The contracting workload for the notional operational CONS was loosely built on the 
FY2016 28 CONS contract data. As previously mentioned, the 28 CONS contract data only 
serves as a baseline for developing a construct of what a typical operational CONS may 
execute during any given FY. Refer to Table 6 for the notional operational CONS workload. 
The workload data was optimized using the theoretical manpower optimization 
model. The results are displayed in Table 7. 
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Table 6.   Notional Operational CONS Workload—No Strategically Sourced Spend 
 
 








Applied Rate Transaction Cost
Commodity Contract (Commercial > $150K or Master 
Strategically Sourced Contract) 16
475.1 42.94$                                326,375.47$                     
Commodity DO 100 40.25 25.47$                                102,528.95$                     
Commodity PO 100 35.46 25.47$                                90,327.37$                        
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Commodity 0
24.15 23.72$                                -$                                    
Service Contract (Commercial > $150K or Master 
Strategically Sourced Contract) 16
615.08 42.94$                                422,536.36$                     
Service TO 59 219.66 28.00$                                362,839.67$                     
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service 
(Commercial>$150K) 0
131.796 28.00$                                -$                                    
Service PO (Commercial <$150K) 10 38.37 28.00$                                10,742.46$                        
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Service 
(Commercial<$150K) 0
23.022 28.00$                                -$                                    
Construction (> $150K or Master Strategically Sourced 
Contract) 14
477.92 42.94$                                287,273.62$                     
Construction TO 50 86.7 28.00$                                121,367.07$                     
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Construction 0 60.69 28.00$                                -$                                    
A&E (> $150K or Master Strategically Sourced Contract) 2 449.19 42.94$                                38,572.04$                        
A&E TO 15 145.42 28.00$                                61,069.89$                        
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced A&E 0 101.794 28.00$                                -$                                    
BPA 16 69.1 25.47$                                28,162.98$                        
Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced BPA 0 41.46 23.72$                                -$                                    
Sealed Bid 12 214.03 25.47$                                65,423.91$                        
Options 38 22.34 23.72$                                20,135.59$                        
Modifications 228 17.22 23.72$                                93,124.86$                        
Closeouts 25 7.63 23.72$                                4,524.41$                          








MAJ CAPT LT CMSGT SMSGT MSGT TSGT SSGT SRA A1C
Man-Hours 1476 2952 1296 130 130 2657 2165 2722 3240 2592
Fully Burdened Rate per 
Hour $58.53 $48.42 $35.74 $50.82 $42.68 $38.19 $33.33 $28.28 $23.03 $17.84
$659,294.00
Personnel Mix 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 2
Anuual Wage 122,157.62$       101,052.11$       74,585.25$         106,060.18$       89,072.87$         79,712.53$         69,560.87$         59,030.22$         48,072.74$         37,229.76$         $1,452,474.82
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B. SIMULATING AFICA’S INTERNAL MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION 
First, the FY2016 28 CONS contract data was reviewed to develop a notional 
allocation basis for migrating open-market contract categories into their associated 
strategically sourced contract categories. The FY2016 28 CONS Federal Procurement Data 
System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data revealed that the 28 CONS extensively leveraged 
or could have leveraged strategically sourced contracts for various commodities and services. 
In total, 28 CONS COs executed or may have potentially executed 62 strategically sourced 
contract actions across a variety of different requirements. Excluding modifications, 
strategically sourced contracts accounted for 26% of all contract actions. Any FY2016 28 
CONS contract actions that satisfied any of the following criteria were counted as 
strategically sourced contract actions: 
• Contracts executed against a strategically sourced contract 
• Contracts that a CO could have procured through a strategically sourced 
contract 
• Contracts that a CO will likely procure through a strategically sourced 
contract in the near future (e.g., Carpeting, Transient Alert) 
Based on the findings, (1) 25% of all open-market commodity contracts were 
migrated to the Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced Commodity contract category, 
(2) 25% of all open-market service contracts were migrated to either the Decentrally 
Executed, Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial > $150,000) or Decentrally Executed, 
Strategically Sourced Service (Commercial < $150,000) contract categories, (3) 10% of all 
open-market construction contracts were migrated to the Decentrally Executed, Strategically 
Sourced Construction contract category, and (4) 50% of all open-market BPAs were 
migrated to the Decentrally Executed, Strategically Sourced BPA category.  
Refer to Table 8 for the notional operational CONS workload with strategically 
sourced contracting. The workload data was optimized using the theoretical manpower 
optimization model. The results are displayed in Table 9. 
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Table 8.   Notional Operational Contracting Squadron Workload—With 
Strategically Sourced Spend 
 
 
Table 9.   Optimized Manpower—With Strategically Sourced Spend 
 
MAJ CAPT LT CMSGT SMSGT MSGT TSGT SSGT SRA A1C
Man-Hours 1107 2214 988 99 99 1993 1624 2076 2471 1977
Fully Burdened Rate per 
Hour $58.53 $48.42 $35.74 $50.82 $42.68 $38.19 $33.33 $28.28 $23.03 $17.84
$497,728.33
Personnel Mix 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
Anuual Wage 122,157.62$       101,052.11$       74,585.25$         106,060.18$       89,072.87$         79,712.53$         69,560.87$         59,030.22$         48,072.74$         37,229.76$         $1,181,192.36
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C. MANPOWER VARIANCE BETWEEN THE OPTIMIZED MANPOWER 
OUTPUTS 
The manpower variance between the optimized manpower outputs revealed one Maj, 
one Capt, and one SrA in manpower savings. Refer to Table 10 for the manpower variance 
results. 
Table 10.   Manpower Variance Table 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summation, this project sought to answer one central question: How can AFICA 
leverage process savings to identify manpower savings that may be used to address other 
mission objectives? The findings suggest that internal manpower optimizations may reveal 
excess contracting capacity that may be used to meet other mission objectives. The 
paragraphs below contain (1) an analysis of the findings, (2) recommendations for how 
AFICA may use the manpower savings to meet mission objectives, (3) topics for future 
research, and (4) closing remarks. 
A. FINDINGS 
Due to a lack of empirical (1) man-hour data for strategically sourced contracts, (2) 
labor input data for open-market contracts, and (3) data for MAFs and OLFs, the model can 
only be used to consider the potential manpower benefits of process savings achieved 
through strategically sourced contracts. Despite the limitations of the model, the LP was 
sufficient for demonstrating how AFICA may theoretically identify manpower savings at the 
operational CONS level that may be used to address other mission objectives. 
1. The Revised Transaction Cost Schedule 
The most important contributions of the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule are the 
inclusion of (1) strategically sourced contract categories and (2) the tacit assumption that not 
all man-hour savings are the same.  
As previously mentioned, AFICA’s (2017) Process Savings Table cannot ascertain 
the true process savings of a strategically sourced contract because it is missing strategically 
sourced contract categories. Consequently, operational CONSs can only report man-hour 
savings achieved by comparing open-market contract categories. The Revised Transaction 
Cost Schedule incorporated strategically sourced contract categories and their associated 
man-hour estimates to provide a better framework to analyze process savings achieved 
through strategically sourced contracts. 
Additionally, AFICA’s (2017) Process Savings Table assumes all man-hours are 
equal regardless of the actual labor inputs that went into a given hour of work. Conversely, 
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the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule accounts for manpower inputs in respect to contract 
complexity. Consequently, man-hour savings involving converting complex contract 
categories into simple categories (e.g., reducing the number of commodity contracts and 
increasing commodity TOs) are more valuable because the man-hour savings account for the 
lower transaction costs of executing a simpler contract category (e.g., less Capt labor inputs 
and more SrA labor inputs). 
Although the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule offers a more refined framework to 
analyze man-hour and transaction cost differences between open-market and decentrally 
executed, strategically sourced contracts, there is no empirical evidence that explicitly 
supports the idea that decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts require less man-
hours than comparable open-market contracts. As previously mentioned, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that currently, there is little to no man-hour difference between comparable open-
market and decentrally executed, strategically sourced contracts. However, evidence from the 
commercial sector, foreign public procurement agencies, and the OMB’s aggressive push to 
leverage best-in-class acquisition practices suggests that over the long-run, AFICA may reap 
significant man-hour savings through strategically sourced contracts. 
2. Can AFICA Leverage Process Savings to Identify Excess Manpower that 
May be Used to Address Other Mission Objectives? 
Theoretically, yes. The manpower optimization model provided a theoretical 
framework to analyze the manpower impact of leveraging process savings achieved through 
strategically sourced contracts at the operational CONS level. As evidenced by the 
optimization output in Chapter V, the notional operational CONS may save one Maj, one 
Capt, and one SrA by leveraging man-hour savings achieved through strategically sourced 
contracts. Although the model is insufficient for making definitive manpower decisions, the 
model provided a theoretical framework that affirmed the plausibility of optimizing 
manpower in respect to process savings.  
Although the model generates notional manpower savings, it does not provide an 
answer to how the manpower savings should be used to address other mission objectives. 
The following section contains a discussion on recommendations for how AFICA may use 
the excess manpower. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HOW AFICA MAY USE THE MANPOWER 
SAVINGS TO MEET MISSION OBJECTIVES 
The following paragraphs contain recommendations for how AFICA may use 
manpower savings to address other mission objectives. Possibilities include allowing CONS 
commanders to gainfully employ its own workforce, assigning AFICA taskers to CONSs 
with excess contracting capacity, or reassigning personnel to undermanned operational 
CONSs, ESSs, or SCONS.  
1. Allow Operational CONS Commanders to Leverage Manpower Savings 
The most intuitive decision is to allow CONS commanders to gainfully employ its 
own workforce. CONS commanders may consider using the slack manpower to focus on 
improving market intelligence, forecasting requirements, analyzing spend, refining 
requirements, engaging in supplier relationship management, enhancing outreach to 
socioeconomic and/or local suppliers, etc. 
2. AFICA May Delegate Work to CONSs with Excess Capacity 
An important aspect of internal manpower optimization is that it gives AFICA 
leadership a top-down view of which operational CONSs may have the capacity to take on 
additional work or meet emergent readiness requirements. AFICA may decide to task 
operational CONSs with additional contracting capacity with more work (e.g., data collection 
and market research). 
3. Horizontal Reassignment 
If possible, AFICA may decide to reassign excess manpower to undermanned 
operational CONSs. Although the utilization rate for each member at the losing CONS will 
increase, the optimized workforce should still be capable of executing their contracting 
mission. Assuming that horizontal reassignment is possible, AFICA must ensure that the 
losing operational CONS does not anticipate a significant change in its contracting workload 
in the foreseeable future. 
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4. Vertical Reassignment 
If possible, excess manpower may be reassigned to an understaffed ESS or SCONS 
that is responsible for developing and implementing strategically sourced contracts. As 
AFICA implements more strategically sourced contracts, future manpower savings may be 
achieved at the operational CONS level. Future manpower savings may be kept within the 
CONS or redistributed horizontally or vertically to meet mission needs. Figure 4 depicts the 
manpower optimization loop. If vertical reassignment is possible, AFICA must ensure that 
the losing operational CONS does not anticipate a significant change in its contracting 
workload in the foreseeable future. 
  
Figure 4.  Manpower Optimization Loop 
ESS/SCONS
ideally composed of 
experienced contracting 
personnel
1) Awards strategically sourced contracts for CONS use
2) Implements strategically sourced contracts














Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 59 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Revised Manpower Standards 
The contract categories contained in the 2014 OC AFMS are inadequate for 
describing the actual man-hour requirement for various contract actions because the contract 
categories are too general. Instead, contract categories should be defined by requirement 
complexity. Brown and Potoski’s (2005) research on transaction cost theory suggests that 
requirement complexity is the major cost driver for a given contract action. It may be more 
helpful to differentiate contracts according to the requirement. For example, a grounds 
maintenance TO is inherently different than a medical service TO even though both are 
service TOs. The requirement type (grounds maintenance versus medical) is the transaction 
cost driver because the complexity of each requirement ultimately drives the labor and time 
inputs necessary for execution and management. Although AFPC is responsible for 
developing manpower standards, AFPC and AFICA may benefit from more accurate 
manpower standards that are defined by requirement complexity. 
2. Empirical Man-Hour Data for Strategically Sourced Contracts 
AFICA may consider analyzing the man-hour impact of each strategically sourced 
contract and tracking changes over time. Over the long-run, decentrally executed, 
strategically sourced contracts should require fewer man-hours to execute and manage due to 
increased learning across the enterprise and best-in-class acquisition practices. 
3. Maximization Model 
AFICA may develop a production model that considers an operational CONS’s 
current manning and optimizes productivity in respect to process savings achieved through 
strategically sourced contracts. The model must find ways to interpret productivity as an 
indicator for things like readiness, quality, efficiency, etc. The framework for a possible 
maximization LP is outlined as follows: 
a. Problem Definition 
Given an operational CONS’s workforce, what is the maximum amount of contracts 
that the CONS can produce? 
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b. Decision Variables 
Assume that the Sealed Bid, Options, Modifications, and Closeouts categories are not 
considered for maximization. 
Let: 
A = The number of commodity contracts, B = The number of commodity DOs, … Q = The 
number of decentrally executed, strategically sourced BPAs 
c. Objective Function 
May consider assigning decision variable coefficients that reflect the level of “worth” 
AFICA attributes to each contract category. 
 
Maximize: 100A + 12B + … + 7Q 
d. Constraints 
Assume contract complexity as described by Table 5. 
Assume 1,463.6 annual man-hours per work unit. 
Available Maj Time  
((.15*475.1)/1,463.6)A+((.01*40.25)/1,463.6)B+ … ((.01*40.25)/1,463.6)Q ≤ Number of 




Available A1C Time 
((.01*475.1)/1,463.6)A+((.40*40.25)/1,463.6)B+ … ((.50*40.25)/1,463.6)Q ≤ Number of 
available A1Cs  
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D. CLOSING REMARKS 
AFICA may be able to leverage process savings achieved through strategically 
sourced contracts to identify excess manpower that may be used to address other mission 
objectives. The Revised Transaction Cost Schedule and manpower optimization model offer 
a theoretical framework to consider the implications of process savings on manpower across 
the enterprise. Although the Revised Transaction Cost Schedule and the manpower model 
theoretically demonstrate the efficacy of manpower optimization, in practice, AFICA may 
not be able to achieve manpower savings in the short-run due to relatively immature 
strategically sourced contracts that lack best-in-class e-procurement platforms, expanded 
GPC purchasing, and enterprise-wide learning. In the long-run, significant process savings 
achieved through strategically sourced contracts may create opportunities for AFICA to 
leverage manpower savings to accomplish other mission objectives. 
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APPENDIX A.  AFICA’S TRANSACTION COST COMPARISON TABLE 
  
What type of process savings is this?
Change of KT Vehicle/ KT Consolidation
Contract Type Quantity Hours Rate Total Contract Type Quantity Total
Commodity 475.1 33.02$     -$                        What was being purchased? Commodity -$                        
Commodity Delivery Order 17 40.25 33.02$     22,593.94$           Commodity Commodity Delivery Order 17 22,593.94$           
Commodity Purchase Order 35.46 33.02$     -$                        Commodity Purchase Order -$                        
Service 615.08 33.02$     -$                        Previouse Cost Service -$                        
Service Task Order 219.66 33.02$     -$                        22,593.94$                                                            Service Task Order -$                        
Service Purchase Order (Commercial <$150K) 38.37 33.02$     -$                        Service Purchase Order (Commercial <$150K) -$                        
Construction 477.92 33.02$     -$                        New Cost Construction -$                        
Construction Task Order 86.7 33.02$     -$                        24,875.62$                                                            Construction Task Order -$                        
A&E 449.19 33.02$     -$                        A&E -$                        
A&E Task Order 145.42 33.02$     -$                        Diffrence (Savings) A&E Task Order -$                        
Sealed Bid 214.13 33.02$     -$                        (2,281.68)$                                                            Sealed Bid -$                        
Blanket Purchase Agreement 69.1 33.02$     -$                        Blanket Purchase Agreement 1 2,281.68$             
Options 22.34 33.02$     -$                        Options -$                        
How were these requirements previously purchased? How were these requirements being purchased?
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APPENDIX B.  AFICA’S WAGE RATE CALCULATION 
 
  




AIR FORCE SPECIALTY 
CODE  TITLE AFSC GRD Fully Burdened  
Rate
6 Contracting 64P3 MAJ 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 $58.53
7 Contracting 64P3 CPT 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 $48.42
8 Contracting 64P3 LT 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 $35.74




6C091 SMS 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 $42.68
11 Contracting Craftsman 6C071 MSG 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 $38.19
12
Contracting Craftsman 6C071 TSG 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12
$33.33
13
Contracting Journeyman 6C051 SSGT 10 11 11 12 12 12 13 13 13
$28.28
14 Contracting Journeyman 6C051 SRA 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 $23.03
15
Contracting Apprentice 6C031 A1C 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7
$17.84

































= 33.02276306 --> AFICA's Wage 
Rate
WORK CENTER APPLICABILITY MAN-HOUR RANGE
Operational Contracting  FAC 12A0 3595.29-18208.53
MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
Totals
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APPENDIX C.  LONG NOTATION OF MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION 
MODEL 
A. DECISION VARIABLES 
Let: 
 
XA = annual man-hours for a Major 
XB = annual man-hours for a Captain 
XC = annual man-hours for a Lieutenant 
XD = annual man-hours for a Chief Master Sergeant 
XE = annual man-hours for a Senior Master Sergeant 
XF = annual man-hours for a Master Sergeant 
XG = annual man-hours for a Technical Sergeant 
XH = annual man-hours for a Staff Sergeant 
XI = annual man-hours for a Senior Airman 
XJ = annual man-hours for an Airman First Class 
 
Y1 = required man-hours for “Commodity Contract” 
Y2 = required man-hours for “Commodity Delivery Order” 
Y3 = required man-hours for “Commodity Purchase Order” 
Y4 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Commodity Contract/ Delivery Order/ 
Purchase order” 
Y5 = required man-hours for “Service Contract (Commercial > $150,000 & Master Strategic 
Source Contract)” 
Y6 = required man-hours for “Service Task Order” 
Y7 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Service Contract/ Task Order/ Purchase 
Order (Commercial > $150,000)” 
Y8 = required man-hours for “Service Purchase Order (Commercial < $150,000)” 
Y9 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Service Contract/Task Order/ Purchase 
Order (Commercial < $150,000)” 
Y10 = required man-hours for “Construction (> $150,000 & Master Strategic Source 
Contract)” 
Y11 = required man-hours for “Construction Task Order” 
Y12 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Construction Contract/ Task Order” 
Y13 = required man-hours for “Architecture and Engineering (> $150,000 & Master Strategic 
Source Contract)” 
Y14 = required man-hours for “Architecture and Engineering Task Order” 
Y15 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Architecture and Engineering Contract/ 
Task Order” 
Y16 = required man-hours for “Blanket Purchase Agreement” 
Y17 = required man-hours for “Strategically Sourced Blanket Purchase Agreement” 
Y18 = required man-hours for “Sealed Bid” 
Y19 = required man-hours for “Options” 
Y20 = required man-hours for “Modifications” 
Y21 = required man-hours for “Close-outs” 
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ZA1 = contribution percentage of a Major for “Complex Contract” 
ZB1 = contribution percentage of a Captain for “Complex Contract” 
ZC1 = contribution percentage of a Lieutenant for “Complex Contract” 
ZD1 = contribution percentage of a Chief Master Sergeant for “Complex Contract” 
ZE1 = contribution percentage of a Senior Master Sergeant for “Complex Contract” 
ZF1 = contribution percentage of a Master Sergeant for “Complex Contract” 
ZG1 = contribution percentage of a Technical Sergeant for “Complex Contract” 
ZH1 = contribution percentage of a Staff Sergeant for “Complex Contract” 
ZI1 = contribution percentage of a Senior Airman for “Complex Contract” 
ZJ1 = contribution percentage of an Airman First Class for “Complex Contract” 
 
ZA2 = contribution percentage of a Major for “Service, Construction, Architecture and 
Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZB2 = contribution percentage of a Captain for “Service, Construction, Architecture and 
Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZC2 = contribution percentage of a Lieutenant for “Service, Construction, Architecture and 
Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZD2 = contribution percentage of a Chief Master Sergeant for “Service, Construction, 
Architecture and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZE2 = contribution percentage of a Senior Master Sergeant for “Service, Construction, 
Architecture and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZF2 = contribution percentage of a Master Sergeant for “Service, Construction, Architecture 
and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZG2 = contribution percentage of a Technical Sergeant for “Service, Construction, 
Architecture and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZH2 = contribution percentage of a Staff Sergeant for “Service, Construction, Architecture 
and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZI2 = contribution percentage of a Senior Airman for “Service, Construction, Architecture 
and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZJ2 = contribution percentage of an Airman First Class for “Service, Construction, 
Architecture and Engineering Task Order/ Purchase Order” 
 
ZA3 = contribution percentage of a Major for “Commodity Delivery Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZB3 = contribution percentage of a Captain for “Commodity Delivery Order/ Purchase Order” 
ZC3 = contribution percentage of a Lieutenant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ Purchase 
Order” 
ZD3 = contribution percentage of a Chief Master Sergeant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ 
Purchase Order” 
ZE3 = contribution percentage of a Senior Master Sergeant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ 
Purchase Order” 
ZF3 = contribution percentage of a Master Sergeant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ 
Purchase Order” 
ZG3 = contribution percentage of a Technical Sergeant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ 
Purchase Order” 
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ZH3 = contribution percentage of a Staff Sergeant for “Commodity Delivery Order/ Purchase 
Order” 
ZI3 = contribution percentage of a Senior Airman for “Commodity Delivery Order/ Purchase 
Order” 
ZJ3 = contribution percentage of an Airman First Class for “Commodity Delivery Order/ 
Purchase Order” 
 
ZA4 = contribution percentage of a Major for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZB4 = contribution percentage of a Captain for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZC4 = contribution percentage of a Lieutenant for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZD4 = contribution percentage of a Chief Master Sergeant for “Strategically Sourced 
Commodity” 
ZE4 = contribution percentage of a Senior Master Sergeant for “Strategically Sourced 
Commodity” 
ZF4 = contribution percentage of a Master Sergeant for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZG4 = contribution percentage of a Technical Sergeant for “Strategically Sourced 
Commodity” 
ZH4 = contribution percentage of a Staff Sergeant for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZI4 = contribution percentage of a Senior Airman for “Strategically Sourced Commodity” 
ZJ4 = contribution percentage of an Airman First Class for “Strategically Sourced 
Commodity” 
B. USER INPUT VARIABLES 
Let: 
 
Q1 = annual demand for “Commodity Contract” 
Q2 = annual demand for “Commodity Delivery Order” 
Q3 = annual demand for “Commodity Purchase Order” 
Q4 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Commodity Contract/ Delivery Order/ 
Purchase order” 
Q5 = annual demand for “Service Contract (Commercial > $150,000 & Master Strategic 
Source Contract)” 
Q6 = annual demand for “Service Task Order” 
Q7 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Service Contract/ Task Order/ Purchase 
Order (Commercial > $15,000)” 
Q8 = annual demand for “Service Purchase Order (Commercial < $150,000)” 
Q9 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Service Contract/ Task Order/ Purchase 
Order (Commercial < $150,000)” 
Q10 = annual demand for “Construction (> $150,000 & Master Strategic Source Contract)” 
Q11 = annual demand for “Construction Task Order” 
Q12 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Construction Contract/ Task Order” 
Q13 = annual demand for “Architecture and Engineering (> $150,000 & Master Strategic 
Source Contract)” 
Q14 = annual demand for “Architecture and Engineering Task Order” 
Q15 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Architecture and Engineering Contract/ Task 
Order” 
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Q16 = annual demand for “Blanket Purchase Agreement” 
Q17 = annual demand for “Strategically Sourced Blanket Purchase Agreement” 
Q18 = annual demand for “Sealed Bid” 
Q19 = annual demand for “Options” 
Q20 = annual demand for “Modifications” 
Q21 = annual demand for “Close-outs” 
C. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
Min: 58.53XA + 48.42XB + 35.74XC + 50.82XD + 42.68XE + 38.19XF + 33.33XG + 28.28XH 
+ 23.03XI + 17.84XJ 
D. CONSTRAINTS 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y1 * Q1 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y2 * Q2 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y3 * Q3 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y4 * Q4 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y5 * Q5 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y6 * Q6 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y7 * Q7 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y8 * Q8 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y9 * Q9 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y10 * Q10 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y11 * Q11 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y12 * Q12 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y13 * Q13 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y14 * Q14 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y15 * Q15 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y16 * Q16 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y17 * Q17 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y18 * Q18 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y19 * Q19 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y20 * Q20 
XA + XB + XC + XD + XE + XF + XG + XH + XI + XJ ≥ Y21 * Q21 
 
XA ≥ ZA1(Y1 * Q1) 
XA ≥ ZA3(Y2 * Q2) 
XA ≥ ZA3(Y3 * Q3) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y4 * Q4) 
XA ≥ ZA1(Y5 * Q5) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y6 * Q6) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y7 * Q7) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y8 * Q8) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y9 * Q9) 
XA ≥ ZA1(Y10 * Q10) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y11 * Q11) 
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XA ≥ ZA2(Y12 * Q12) 
XA ≥ ZA1(Y13 * Q13) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y14 * Q14) 
XA ≥ ZA2(Y15 * Q15) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y16 * Q16) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y17 * Q17) 
XA ≥ ZA3(Y18 * Q18) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y19 * Q19) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y20 * Q20) 
XA ≥ ZA4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XB ≥ ZB1(Y1 * Q1) 
XB ≥ ZB3(Y2 * Q2) 
XB ≥ ZB3(Y3 * Q3) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y4 * Q4) 
XB ≥ ZB1(Y5 * Q5) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y6 * Q6) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y7 * Q7) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y8 * Q8) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y9 * Q9) 
XB ≥ ZB1(Y10 * Q10) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y11 * Q11) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y12 * Q12) 
XB ≥ ZB1(Y13 * Q13) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y14 * Q14) 
XB ≥ ZB2(Y15 * Q15) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y16 * Q16) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y17 * Q17) 
XB ≥ ZB3(Y18 * Q18) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y19 * Q19) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y20 * Q20) 
XB ≥ ZB4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XC ≥ ZC1(Y1 * Q1) 
XC ≥ ZC3(Y2 * Q2) 
XC ≥ ZC3(Y3 * Q3) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y4 * Q4) 
XC ≥ ZC1(Y5 * Q5) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y6 * Q6) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y7 * Q7) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y8 * Q8) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y9 * Q9) 
XC ≥ ZC1(Y10 * Q10) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y11 * Q11) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y12 * Q12) 
XC ≥ ZC1(Y13 * Q13) 
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XC ≥ ZC2(Y14 * Q14) 
XC ≥ ZC2(Y15 * Q15) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y16 * Q16) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y17 * Q17) 
XC ≥ ZC3(Y18 * Q18) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y19 * Q19) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y20 * Q20) 
XC ≥ ZC4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XD ≥ ZD1(Y1 * Q1) 
XD ≥ ZD3(Y2 * Q2) 
XD ≥ ZD3(Y3 * Q3) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y4 * Q4) 
XD ≥ ZD1(Y5 * Q5) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y6 * Q6) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y7 * Q7) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y8 * Q8) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y9 * Q9) 
XD ≥ ZD1(Y10 * Q10) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y11 * Q11) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y12 * Q12) 
XD ≥ ZD1(Y13 * Q13) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y14 * Q14) 
XD ≥ ZD2(Y15 * Q15) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y16 * Q16) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y17 * Q17) 
XD ≥ ZD3(Y18 * Q18) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y19 * Q19) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y20 * Q20) 
XD ≥ ZD4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XE ≥ ZE1(Y1 * Q1) 
XE ≥ ZE3(Y2 * Q2) 
XE ≥ ZE3(Y3 * Q3) 
XE ≥ ZE4(Y4 * Q4) 
XE ≥ ZE1(Y5 * Q5) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y6 * Q6) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y7 * Q7) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y8 * Q8) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y9 * Q9) 
XE ≥ ZE1(Y10 * Q10) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y11 * Q11) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y12 * Q12) 
XE ≥ ZE1(Y13 * Q13) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y14 * Q14) 
XE ≥ ZE2(Y15 * Q15) 
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XE ≥ ZE4(Y16 * Q16) 
XE ≥ ZE4(Y17 * Q17) 
XE ≥ ZE3(Y18 * Q18) 
XE ≥ ZE4(Y19 * Q19) 
XE ≥ ZE4(Y20 * Q20) 
XE ≥ ZE4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XF ≥ ZF1(Y1 * Q1) 
XF ≥ ZF3(Y2 * Q2) 
XF ≥ ZF3(Y3 * Q3) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y4 * Q4) 
XF ≥ ZF1(Y5 * Q5) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y6 * Q6) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y7 * Q7) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y8 * Q8) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y9 * Q9) 
XF ≥ ZF1(Y10 * Q10) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y11 * Q11) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y12 * Q12) 
XF ≥ ZF1(Y13 * Q13) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y14 * Q14) 
XF ≥ ZF2(Y15 * Q15) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y16 * Q16) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y17 * Q17) 
XF ≥ ZF3(Y18 * Q18) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y19 * Q19) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y20 * Q20) 
XF ≥ ZF4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XG ≥ ZG1(Y1 * Q1) 
XG ≥ ZG3(Y2 * Q2) 
XG ≥ ZG3(Y3 * Q3) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y4 * Q4) 
XG ≥ ZG1(Y5 * Q5) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y6 * Q6) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y7 * Q7) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y8 * Q8) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y9 * Q9) 
XG ≥ ZG1(Y10 * Q10) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y11 * Q11) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y12 * Q12) 
XG ≥ ZG1(Y13 * Q13) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y14 * Q14) 
XG ≥ ZG2(Y15 * Q15) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y16 * Q16) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y17 * Q17) 
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XG ≥ ZG3(Y18 * Q18) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y19 * Q19) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y20 * Q20) 
XG ≥ ZG4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XH ≥ ZH1(Y1 * Q1) 
XH ≥ ZH3(Y2 * Q2) 
XH ≥ ZH3(Y3 * Q3) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y4 * Q4) 
XH ≥ ZH1(Y5 * Q5) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y6 * Q6) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y7 * Q7) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y8 * Q8) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y9 * Q9) 
XH ≥ ZH1(Y10 * Q10) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y11 * Q11) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y12 * Q12) 
XH ≥ ZH1(Y13 * Q13) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y14 * Q14) 
XH ≥ ZH2(Y15 * Q15) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y16 * Q16) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y17 * Q17) 
XH ≥ ZH3(Y18 * Q18) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y19 * Q19) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y20 * Q20) 
XH ≥ ZH4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XI ≥ ZI1(Y1 * Q1) 
XI ≥ ZI3(Y2 * Q2) 
XI ≥ ZI3(Y3 * Q3) 
XI ≥ ZI4(Y4 * Q4) 
XI ≥ ZI1(Y5 * Q5) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y6 * Q6) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y7 * Q7) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y8 * Q8) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y9 * Q9) 
XI ≥ ZI1(Y10 * Q10) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y11 * Q11) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y12 * Q12) 
XI ≥ ZI1(Y13 * Q13) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y14 * Q14) 
XI ≥ ZI2(Y15 * Q15) 
XI ≥ ZI4(Y16 * Q16) 
XI ≥ ZI4(Y17 * Q17) 
XI ≥ ZI3(Y18 * Q18) 
XI ≥ ZI4(Y19 * Q19) 
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XI ≥ ZI4(Y20 * Q20) 
XI ≥ ZI4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XJ ≥ ZJ1(Y1 * Q1) 
XJ ≥ ZJ3(Y2 * Q2) 
XJ ≥ ZJ3(Y3 * Q3) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y4 * Q4) 
XJ ≥ ZJ1(Y5 * Q5) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y6 * Q6) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y7 * Q7) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y8 * Q8) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y9 * Q9) 
XJ ≥ ZJ1(Y10 * Q10) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y11 * Q11) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y12 * Q12) 
XJ ≥ ZJ1(Y13 * Q13) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y14 * Q14) 
XJ ≥ ZJ2(Y15 * Q15) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y16 * Q16) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y17 * Q17) 
XJ ≥ ZJ3(Y18 * Q18) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y19 * Q19) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y20 * Q20) 
XJ ≥ ZJ4(Y21 * Q21) 
 
XA ≥ 0 
XB ≥ 0 
XC ≥ 0 
XD ≥ 0 
XE ≥ 0 
XF ≥ 0 
XG ≥ 0 
XH ≥ 0 
XI ≥ 0 
XJ ≥ 0 
 
Y1 ≥ 0 
Y2 ≥ 0 
Y3 ≥ 0 
Y4 ≥ 0 
Y5 ≥ 0 
Y6 ≥ 0 
Y7 ≥ 0 
Y8 ≥ 0 
Y9 ≥ 0 
Y10 ≥ 0 
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Y11 ≥ 0 
Y12 ≥ 0 
Y13 ≥ 0 
Y14 ≥ 0 
Y15 ≥ 0 
Y16 ≥ 0 
Y17 ≥ 0 
Y18 ≥ 0 
Y19 ≥ 0 
Y20 ≥ 0 
Y21 ≥ 0 
 
Q1 ≥ 0 
Q2 ≥ 0 
Q3 ≥ 0 
Q4 ≥ 0 
Q5 ≥ 0 
Q6 ≥ 0 
Q7 ≥ 0 
Q8 ≥ 0 
Q9 ≥ 0 
Q10 ≥ 0 
Q11 ≥ 0 
Q12 ≥ 0 
Q13 ≥ 0 
Q14 ≥ 0 
Q15 ≥ 0 
Q16 ≥ 0 
Q17 ≥ 0 
Q18 ≥ 0 
Q19 ≥ 0 
Q20 ≥ 0 
Q21 ≥ 0 
 
ZA1 ≥ 0 
ZB1 ≥ 0 
ZC1 ≥ 0 
ZD1 ≥ 0 
ZE1 ≥ 0 
ZF1 ≥ 0 
ZG1 ≥ 0 
ZH1 ≥ 0 
ZI1 ≥ 0 
ZJ1 ≥ 0 
 
ZA2 ≥ 0 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 77 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
ZB2 ≥ 0 
ZC2 ≥ 0 
ZD2 ≥ 0 
ZE2 ≥ 0 
ZF2 ≥ 0 
ZG2 ≥ 0 
ZH2 ≥ 0 
ZI2 ≥ 0 
ZJ2 ≥ 0 
 
ZA3 ≥ 0 
ZB3 ≥ 0 
ZC3 ≥ 0 
ZD3 ≥ 0 
ZE3 ≥ 0 
ZF3 ≥ 0 
ZG3 ≥ 0 
ZH3 ≥ 0 
ZI3 ≥ 0 
ZJ3 ≥ 0 
 
ZA4 ≥ 0 
ZB4 ≥ 0 
ZC4 ≥ 0 
ZD4 ≥ 0 
ZE4 ≥ 0 
ZF4 ≥ 0 
ZG4 ≥ 0 
ZH4 ≥ 0 
ZI4 ≥ 0 
ZJ4 ≥ 0 
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